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ABSTRACT

This study examined the experiences and present attitudes of Japanese and American Fulbrighters who went to the United States (U.S.) and Japan during the period 1951-90. The study sought to understand how these graduate students and scholars incorporated education and related experiences in a different society and culture into their own lives. The study used a common questionnaire to which 789 of 1148 Japanese responded and 338 of 683 American participants responded. In addition, personal interviews with 19 selected Japanese Fulbrighters were conducted. A comparable number of Americans also responded to more detailed questions by phone interviews or in writing. The research focused on Fulbright experiences and present views about selected Japan-United States issues. The analysis of responses found that: (1) Japanese who went earlier to the United States were more affected than those who went later; (2) Americans who went to Japan later were more affected than those who went earlier; (3) both groups agreed on the importance of reforms initiated by the U.S. occupation in facilitating the emergence of the present economically prosperous Japan; and (4) they also agreed that the consensus-oriented, hard-working characteristics of the Japanese were important. The study concludes that these experiences have had major and continuing positive influences on the lives of most all participants. (JB)

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IIE Research Report Number Twenty-Five

A COMPARISON OF JAPANESE AND AMERICAN FULBRIGHTERS

EUGENE UYEKI,

HE 026 996

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as others see us

A COMPARISON OF JAPANESE AND AMERICAN FULBRIGHTERS

EUGENE UYEKI, Case Western Reserve University

The Japan–United States Educational Commission
and the Institute of International Education

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Foreword

As part of the 40th anniversary of the Fulbright program in Japan in 1992, several studies analyzing the impact of the program have been produced. Ken Kondo, a Japanese alumnus, wrote *The Other Side of Japan–U.S. Relations: 40 Years of the Fulbright Program*, which I understand is the first book in Japanese describing the history of the program. The title refers to the fact that the media in both countries write only about the negative aspects of Japan–U.S. economic relations, neglecting to mention the solid foundation of very positive relationships that exists on the personal level—to which the Fulbright program has been a key contributor.

This is confirmed by the results of Professor Uyeki's unique current study of Japanese and American alumni, which describes the profound impact the Fulbright experience had on the alumni's views of their own country and their host country. The study also compares the views of Fulbright alumni with those of colleagues who have not spent substantial time in the host country and finds that the colleagues who have not been Fulbrighters tend to hold more extreme views of the other country than Fulbrighters, who have a better understanding of the positive and negative aspects of a society from the experience and knowledge gained while living abroad. An earlier study by Professor Kobayashi of Kyoto University also confirmed the life-changing nature of the program on the Japanese alumni, both professionally and personally.

Such was my hope when I introduced the program after World War II. As I have said many times since, I do not think educational exchange is certain

to produce affection between peoples, nor indeed do I think that is one of its necessary purposes; it is quite enough if it contributes to the feeling of a common humanity.

Although the Japanese Fulbrighters comprise only about 6,000 of the approximately 190,000 people throughout the world who have Fulbright grants, their impact in Japanese society—and on Japan–U.S. relations—as leaders in education, business, government, the arts, journalism, and other fields has been immeasurable. Their multiplier effect has been far greater in Japan's hierarchical society than one could expect in the United States. Since organizing themselves into 10 regional alumni associations in 1982 (the 30th anniversary of the program), they have conducted a continuous fundraising campaign to increase the number of American Fulbrighters to Japan as a gesture of their indebtedness to the program. Through their efforts, they now provide almost half the total number of annual grants to Americans each year. Inspired by their example, alumni associations in other countries have begun similar activities, further multiplying the Fulbright impact.

American Fulbrighters to Japan are even less in number, comprising about 1,300. They are also concentrated in the academic and nonprofit sectors, although increasingly more Americans from the private sector have been provided Fulbright awards through the generosity of funds raised by Japanese Fulbrighters. American Fulbrighters to Japan, also, in their own more individualistic ways, have made their influence felt with regard to clarifying and explaining the complexity of Japan–U.S. relations. The concentration of American Fulbrighters in the academic world makes their influence more indirect, but also extensive.

This binational study of American and Japanese alumni is a valuable addition to the growing body of literature about the program, since it breaks new ground in helping us better comprehend the process of mutual understanding that has become even more critical in recent years.

Senator J. William Fulbright

Introduction

This study of Japanese and American Fulbrighters results from the serendipitous coincidence of a number of events. My experiences as a Fulbright lecturer at Hokkaido University in 1985 sensitized me to the complexities of adjustment and adaptation that were necessary in the course of carrying on my educational activities as well as in living in a country so different from the United States. Further reading persuaded me that this process of intercultural adaptation would be an interesting topic to pursue. In 1989 I wrote to the Executive Director of the Japan–United States Educational Commission, Ms. Caroline A. Matano Yang, to seek her assistance in a study of Japanese Fulbrighters who had come to the United States. She replied that as part of the 40th anniversary of the Fulbright Program in Japan in 1992, she had been considering a bilateral study of both Japanese and American Fulbrighters. She mentioned that at the initiative of the Institute of International Education (IIE), Professor Tetsuya Kobayashi of Kyoto University and his colleagues were conducting a survey of Japanese Fulbrighters as part of a comparative study with German Fulbrighters (which was never conducted). Professor Kobayashi's study included graduate students who had been supported through the GARIOA (Government Aid and Relief to Occupied Areas) program from 1947 to 1951. The two study designs were complementary in objectives (see Appendix I for an abstract of the findings of Professor Kobayashi's study). It was Professor Kobayashi's suggestion to include non-Fulbrighters in this study for comparative purposes.

The final questionnaire was the result of extensive consultations with Caroline Yang, who organized the survey effort in Japan. Her staff translated the

questionnaire into Japanese. Mr. Takashi Yasumi, administrative officer, assisted with computer input of data, and Ms. Keiko Tohyama entered the Japanese survey data and provided English translations of comments made by the Japanese Fulbrighters.

On the American side, Professor Morell Heald provided wise counsel at all stages of the project, particularly in the early stages of conceptualization. Professor Ann Sherif was very helpful in consultations about questions appropriate for both American and Japanese Fulbrighters. Tracy Fedirko provided sophisticated statistical analyses as well as suggestions for interpretations of the findings that have greatly improved the analyses. Dean Suzanne Ferguson of Case Western Reserve University facilitated a semester sabbatical in 1991 that permitted me to devote full time to this study at a crucial time in the project. Ms. Peggy Blumenthal and associates at the IIE in New York City skillfully edited the manuscript.

Thus, this present bilateral study was conceived and carried out with the active support of Ms. Caroline Yang and funding by the Japan–United States Educational Commission, with IIE sharing in the publication costs. I want to thank all these individuals and organizations for their assistance and support, which made it possible to finish this study in a timely fashion.

Finally, I want to thank all of the Japanese and American Fulbrighters who took the time to respond conscientiously to the questionnaire and make comments. I know that some were skeptical that a survey could adequately convey the nuanced complexity of the Fulbright experience and its influence on subsequent careers and lives. I hope that the analyses and interpretations offered in the study fit with many of their own observations and evaluations of the range and intensities of the Fulbright experience, and that each Fulbrighter can locate his/her own place within the patterns described for the Japanese and American Fulbrighters.

Eugene S. Uyeki

I. A Study of Japanese and American Fulbrighters

Introduction

This is a study of the experiences and present attitudes of Japanese and American Fulbrighters who went to the United States and Japan during the period 1951–90. The theoretical problem of interest is to understand the ways in which individuals incorporate educational and related experiences in a different society and culture into their own lives. Recipients of Fulbright grants provide particularly appropriate subjects to study this process. All Fulbrighters were adults, socialized in their home countries—Japan or the United States—who spent an important period of time in the host country undertaking graduate education, research, or teaching. They also interacted with persons outside the groups related specifically to their educational projects: members of the public of the host society. The vast majority of Fulbrighters have returned to their home countries to pursue their careers and live out their private lives. Japan and the United States are quite different societies whose destinies have been profoundly intertwined since Japan's defeat in World War II and the American occupation, and are so in the present. The relative positions of the two countries, however measured, have changed during the last half century, becoming closer to parity. Thus, a study of Japanese and American Fulbrighters illuminates how intercultural educational experiences are incorporated by individuals in the context of changing historical relationships between two countries.

The Fulbright Program is an example of the international exchange of students. Many studies of the international exchange of students and scholars

are available (see bibliographies by Spencer and Awe, 1970; Von Klemperer, 1973; and Weaver, 1989). For materials about the Fulbright Program in general, and specifically about exchanges with Japan, see *The Fulbright Program: A History* (Johnson and Colligan, 1965, Ch. 13), the description of special country programs in *The Fulbright Experience and Academic Exchanges* (Yang, 1987, pp. 85–91), and essay accounts by American and Japanese Fulbrighters in *The Fulbright Experience, 1946-1986* (Dudden and Dynes, 1987, Chs. 8, 10, 26, 32, 33, 34).

International education is necessarily situated in the context of relations between two countries. The Useems stated this succinctly in their study of Indians who had studied in the United States and England:

> Any appraisal of a social enterprise that straddles two or more cultures must take into account the expectations and assumptions of the members of both societies. The aims of a foreign education cannot be isolated from the environment in which they originate; they are related to economic, political, and educational conditions within a society, to the relationships between societies, and to changes in perspective in response to the dynamic processes of historical development (Useem and Useem, 1955, p. 12).

Similarly, a diplomat and former Fulbrighter, speaking in general about the Fulbright Program observes that, "Each bilateral relationship has its own history and character, but by and large each is still either a giving or a getting process, each covering a subtle mirror play of national pride and ambivalence" (Arndt, in Dudden and Dynes, 1987, p. 29). An example of the complexities and national sensitivities involved in the case of Japan and the United States is summarized in a footnote about the 1979 agreement to place the Japan–United States Fulbright program on a 50%–50% cost-sharing basis, an agreement that does not mention the Fulbright Program:

> The Japanese government could not logically agree to support half of what is essentially a U.S. government program; thus there is no mention of Fulbright exchanges. After the agreement was signed, resulting in a change of the commission's name from "U.S. Educational Commission in Japan" to "Japan–U.S. Educational Commission," the Japanese agreed that for practical—*honne*—purposes, "Fulbright Program" in parentheses could be used after the name of the commission, since it was widely recognized in Japan. (Yang, 1987, pp. 86–87).

The bilateral historical situation has changed dramatically since the initiation of the Japan–United States Fulbright Exchange Program. At the beginning, Japan was a country recovering from the physical and psychological devastation of World War II and had just regained its sovereignty with the sign-

ing of the peace treaty with the United States. By the late 1980s, Japan had become a very powerful and important economic power, competitive with the United States in many sectors. President Bush's trip to Japan in January 1992 with the chief executives of the three largest American automobile manufacturers—to persuade the Japanese to buy more American automotive products—symbolized the inroads that Japanese productivity had made in a key American industry. Such differences in the power/prestige position of the two countries must have impacted on the expectations and experiences of sensitive, sophisticated sojourners such as the Japanese and American Fulbrighters.

Soon after the occupation, the United States government instituted the GARIOA program, and 1,047 Japanese went to the United States for graduate education (Yang, 1987; Schwantes, 1955; Bennett, Passin, and McKnight, 1958). With the initiation of the Japanese Fulbright Program in 1952, the GARIOA program was phased out. The motivations for most GARIOA and early Japanese Fulbrighters were clear: They were going to the United States to study and bring back skills to rebuild and modernize Japan. They were following in the footsteps of earlier generations of Japanese students who had gone to Europe and the United States to acquire education useful to the development and modernization of Japan. Many Japanese Fulbrighters were undoubtedly curious about the United States, the powerful country that had defeated Japan decisively and through its occupation policy was determined to change Japan into a peaceful democratic society. A few may have felt alienated from Japanese society and were seeking experiences in a different society in order to explore new life styles.

The situation for American Fulbrighters was different. Their motivation was a mixture of idealism (working for international peace) and specialist interest in Japan. Later on, particularly for lecturers, other motivations, such as exploration of or immersion in a very different culture from that of the United States, came into play.

A brief review of the literature on international exchange of students and scholars, particularly Fulbrighters, will provide a background for the present research. Most studies use as a framework the sequential steps involved in the international educational exchange process: selection, motivations, and expectations of the graduate student/scholar; the sojourn experience; the returnee experience; and impact on career and personal life. Comprehensive studies that consider all parts of this process are those of the Useems (1955) on Indians who studied in the United States and England; MacGregor's (1957) study of American Fulbright Research scholars and lecturers to India, Egypt, and Iraq; Rose's (1976) study of several hundred American and for-

eign Fulbright–Hayes scholars who had gone to or come from East Asia and the Pacific; Schwantes' (1955) historical study of Japanese students who went to the United States; and the social-psychological study by Bennett, Passin, and McKnight (1958), who organized their study of Japanese students in the United States from 1918 to 1957 around the problem of national and personal identity. Cora DuBois (1958) synthesized work done by other scholars on the relations of American universities and world affairs. She developed a typology that followed the foreign student from the home country in terms of prearrival attitudes, the value configurations in America that faced the student, and the stages of adjustment in the United States and upon return. She focused on an aspect of personal identity—self-esteem—seen to be psychologically anchored in a nation's status and an important factor in mediating the sojourn experience. There is, importantly, an experience of contrast for a person going to a foreign country for study or teaching that highlights aspects of national identity (Bennett et al., 1958).

Differing motivations or goals of the graduate student or scholar are related to adjustment during the sojourner's experience in these studies. For example, students with professional or pragmatic objectives, such as studying for a degree, make better adjustments than those who went abroad because of their alienation from their home country (DuBois, 1958; Bennett et al., 1958; Schwantes, 1955). The younger the age of the sojourner, the greater the influence of the host country. Adjustment in the host country appears U-shaped when charted, being better for those who stayed 6 to 18 months compared to those who stayed a shorter or longer period of time (DuBois). Facility in the language of the host country is important to adjustment.

There are differences according to the particular pair of countries involved in the educational exchanges. The typical student goes from a country that is authoritarian and patriarchal, with subordinate status for women, to a Western society, usually Britain or the United States, that is democratic and individualistic, with greater equality between the sexes (Useem and Useem, 1955). The net impact of such experiences result in changes in the outlook of the sojourners.

There is exchange in the other direction as well. The general difficulties faced by American researchers and lecturers who went to Egypt, Iraq, and India were intensified for women students and scholars and wives of the Fulbrighters (MacGregor, 1957). Schwantes (1955) and Bennett et al. (1958) describe the difficulties faced by Japanese women students on their return from abroad. The Useems, on the other hand, did not find that Indian women students had any more difficulties in adjustment on their return than did the men. The im-

pact of different societal and cultural contexts as well as those of historical periods are noted in the studies. The Useems describe how important the independence of India was in motivating the Indian student. Indian students who studied in England and the United States returned with quite different perceptions of English and American values. Bennett and colleagues state that Japanese students before World War II felt more at home in Europe than in the United States.

Earlier Studies about the Fulbright Program

There have been several studies dealing with the Fulbright Program. Peter I. Rose conducted a two-year study of the Senior Fulbright–Hayes Program by interviews and questionnaires that focused on generating policy recommendations to make the program more effective in terms of enhancing "mutual understanding, academic achievement, and personal honor" (Rose, 1976, p. 19). A study of American Fulbright research scholars and lecturers to Egypt, India, and Iraq found that researchers had returned home with a greater sense of satisfaction (MacGregor, 1957). MacGregor used accounts of individual cases to illustrate a range of experiences in the Near Eastern countries, focusing on personal motivations, the foreign university situation, and life outside the university for the Fulbrighter and his/her family. He discusses the difficulty faced by women Fulbrighters and the wives of Fulbrighters.

A book of essays by Fulbrighters– mostly American—was edited by Dudden and Dynes (1987). Two long introductory essays, one by Arndt and one by Winks, provide overviews of the program. These are followed by shorter essays that "are like snapshots in which the authors focus on some aspect of their Fulbright experience" (p. 11). For example, a charming piece by Japanese Fulbrighter Tsuboi recalls his trip from Okayama, Japan, to visit Princeton in search of F. Scott Fitzgerald (pp. 259–262). Another Japanese Fulbrighter emphasizes the significance of the U.S.–Japan relationship during the GARIOA phase (1949–51) as an enduring orientation. Kuriyama points to the friendliness and generosity of the United States shortly after World War II and of the gratitude of the Japanese students who came to this country to study. He concludes that grant recipients "have favorably influenced Japanese public opinion toward the United States to an extent disproportionately great to their limited number" (p. 256). Though quite fascinating and insightful, the essays in total do not, and were not meant to, provide a comprehensive understanding of the Fulbright experience. *The Fulbright Experience and Academic Exchanges* (1987) provides descriptions and interpretations of different aspects of the Fulbright Program from the standpoint of officials in different countries

involved in the program. For example, there is an article on "Multiple Cost Sharing: The Japan Experience," (Yang, C.A.M., pp. 85–91). Particularly relevant to the present research are two works about Japanese students who went abroad for education. The first study by Robert S. Schwantes (1955) provides a historical view of Japan–United States student exchanges. Japanese students started to go to the United States shortly after the Meiji Restoration. Schwantes observes that the students all faced difficulties when they returned to Japan, highlighting the historical isolation and perhaps insularity of the country. However, students who went earlier had an easier time in finding important positions upon their return than those who went later. Schwantes describes the careers of the returnees—some quite successful—in education, government, and business. He notes the special difficulties faced by women educated abroad. Finally, he notes that the number of American students who studied in Japan was not "anything like equal [in] volume" (p. 214).

The second study, by Bennett, Passin, and McKnight (1958), organizes its social–psychological explorations around the theme of a search for national and personal identity by Japanese students who went to the United States in the period after World War I. The researchers also include materials on the GARIOA-sponsored students and the first Japanese Fulbrighters to the United States from 1952 to 1957. From the interwar student data, they derived an empirical typology of two general types of Japanese students: the professional and graduate student, who goes abroad to gain education useful to a professional role in Japan, and the "alienee," who seeks education abroad because "it seemed the only alternative" (p. 62).

The vast majority of Japanese who went abroad after World War II were typified by the "mature goal-directed professional," very similar to the interwar type (Bennett et al., 1958). A total of 51 students comprised the sample for their study, with 26 being studied while in the United States. For this group, they developed a three-fold typology of students. The "adjustor" was the most common type, concerned with how the educational experience in the United States would assist in achieving professional goals in Japan. The "idealist" was more typically concerned with "problems of self and national definition" (p. 110). They also found a third type, the "constrictor," those "ideologically narrow students who tend to see America and their own culture in rigid and biased terms" (pp. 111-12). Some returnees (not the same ones studied in the United States) were being studied concurrently by a Japanese team. The researchers attempted to create a synthetic cohort by relating the two samples together. However, they found it difficult to classify the returnees into the three types—adjustor, constrictor, alienee—that they had developed to describe the

experiences of Japanese students in America. The researchers concluded that the different situations facing the student in the two countries—as sojourner in America and long-term resident at home in Japan—were significant in eliciting different types of behavior. "Out of context" in the United States, the Japanese student was attempting new responses; hence, the three types. Back home, in a familiar context, the American responses no longer were relevant; Japanese responses were called for. The returnees blended toward the middle type, the "adjustor" who is concerned with his professional career. The problems faced by Japanese women educated in America on their return are given special attention by the researchers. The difficult role faced by returning women in a male-oriented culture is signified by their depiction of the female Japanese student who goes abroad as similar to the "prewar young alienee type" (p. 176).

On the basis of their multiyear and multidisciplinary research, the authors concluded with suggestions regarding future research into intercultural experiences: "The process of intercultural experience is unique for the national culture group undergoing it and, to a large extent, for the individual. The aspects of intercultural experience that we wish to know the most about are precisely those that refer to the differences between individuals and groups traceable to their particular social and cultural origins, and their reactions to their origins. We advocate more research into particular cases, into the configurations of individual experience in different cultural settings; and perhaps less research at the level of generalized attitude and personality tests" (Bennett et al., 1958, p. 179).

The point of departure of this research is that contextual factors seem to be so significant that social personality types do not predict attitudes or behavior very well, even in the short term. Longer-term continuity of social personality requires continuity of societal contexts. That cannot be assumed for many Fulbrighters, since we are asking about their recollections of behavior and attitudes of 40 years ago. This study does not develop a psychological typology. Rather, the emphasis is upon understanding the reactions of the Fulbrighters collectively to the host society as they pursued their educational objectives, and the consequences this had on their lives and present attitudes. Where possible, we will make an effort to demonstrate differences among the Fulbrighters that are related to differences in the range of consequences. All of the cited studies emphasize the importance of the historical context of intercountry or bilateral relationships in understanding the exchange experiences of students between them. Thus, the changing relationship between Japan and the United States will be delineated and utilized in understanding the experiences of the Japanese and American Fulbrighters.

Research Design

The major research instrument was a common questionnaire to which Japanese and American Fulbrighters responded. It was originally written in English and translated into Japanese by professional staff in the office of the Japan–United States Educational Commission in Tokyo. The questions are the same except where experiences in the host country were surveyed (i.e., Japanese Fulbrighters were asked about aspects of American society they observed and American Fulbrighters were asked about aspects of Japanese society they observed). This research design is rare among studies of international education and maximizes the comparability of the responses. The questionnaires were sent out in the summer of 1991. In addition, personal interviews with selected Japanese Fulbrighters (N = 19) were undertaken in early 1992 in Tokyo. A comparable number of Americans also responded to more detailed questions by phone interviews or in writing. Their responses are utilized at appropriate places in the discussion to clarify the information gathered by the questionnaires.

The research focused on the experiences of Fulbrighters and their present views about selected Japan–U.S. issues. With regard to their experiences, we were interested in questions such as: What were the goals and motivations of Japanese and American Fulbrighters in seeking international educational experience in the United States and Japan? To what extent did they achieve these goals? What were their educational experiences in the host country? To what extent did they find social patterns typical of the host country? What is their present assessment of these social patterns? What cultural characteristics of their home and host country/university system facilitated or hindered their educational experience in the host country? To what extent did they feel "at home" in the host country? How did the Fulbright experience impact on their professional lives, their families, and personal situations? To what extent have they incorporated host-country values into their own lifestyles?

To assess their views about Japan–U.S. issues, we listed a number of statements and asked the Fulbrighters to choose one of four ordered categories (strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree). These included the influence of the American occupation and subsequent relations with America on the evolution of Japanese society and values since World War II; the future role of Japan in international affairs; the work commitment of the younger generation in both countries; the adequacy of the educational system in Japan and the United States; factors related to trade problems between Japan and the United States; and the net impact of Japan and the United

States on each other since World War II. Finally, we asked them for present (1991) assessments (very high, high, low, very low) of Japan and the United States with respect to levels of activity in science, arts, economic development, political leadership, family life, and quality of the environment.

II. The Overseas Experience

Description of the Sample

The total number of Japanese Fulbrighters from 1949 to 1991 is 6,112 (including GARIOA students): comprised of 13.7% females and 86.3% males. (Only first grants are counted—there were 161 second or more grants to Japanese Fulbrighters, and similar data for American Fulbrighters are not available.) The total number of American Fulbrighters from 1952 to 1989 is 1,338, with 18.1% females and 81.9% males. The number of awards to Japanese was much larger until 1968. From 1952 through 1968, an average of 218.7 awards were made annually to Japanese, and from 1969 through 1991, the average fell to 43.5 awards annually. For American Fulbrighters, there were no large changes in the number of awards from 1952 through 1989, with an average of 34.4 awards annually. There were differences in the types of awards to Japanese and American Fulbrighters. The percentage of Japanese Fulbrighters who were graduate students is much larger; the percentage of American Fulbrighters who were lecturers is much larger also. The percentage of graduate students is 21.8% for Americans and 65.8% for Japanese Fulbrighters. The number of research grant recipients is 29.8% for Americans and 23.5% for the Japanese. Lecturers comprised 35.2% of American Fulbrighters and 2.5% of the Japanese. Teachers of English as a foreign language were 12% of American Fulbrighters, and 5.8% of the Japanese Fulbrighters participated under the Teachers Development Program. A small percentage, 1.2% of Americans and 0.5% of Japanese, were International Education Administrators. A very small percentage of the Japanese, 0.9%, were sponsored as Undergraduate Development Program, and categories for 1% were not known.

The differences in types of awards given to Japanese and American Fulbrighters are related to the different needs of the two societies during this period. In the years shortly after World War II, the United States was very much ahead technologically and industrially. Japan's infrastructure and institutions were in disarray. The Japanese students were motivated to learn as much as they could from the United States in order to assist in the reconstruction of Japan. The large number of awards, in the main to graduate students, from 1951 through 1968 (from 1949 if we take into account the GARIOA awards) suggests the importance of American education to Japanese students for purposes of societal reconstruction. After that date, the number of awards made annually to U.S. and Japanese Fulbrighters is similar, although the number awarded to Japanese consistently run slightly higher.

While this study was being initiated, Professor Kobayashi of Kyoto University and his colleagues had organized a study of Japanese Fulbrighters who had gone to the United States as graduate students. (See Appendix I for a summary of that study.) Their objective was to compare their results with a similar study of German Fulbrighters; however, the German part was not implemented. The research reported here implemented a bilateral design to include Japanese and Americans from the beginning of the study. The Kobayashi study inquired into similar areas of sojourn and return experiences but was more process-oriented than this present study. Additionally, this study explores the attitudes of the Fulbrighters abou Japan–U.S. issues. A unique feature of this study is its assessment of the impact of the Fulbright experience on the present attitudes of Japanese and American Fulbrighters, in comparison to the attitudes of Japanese and American "colleagues" of the Fulbrighters who have not had extended educational or work experience in Japan or the United States. The suggestion to include a sample of colleagues of Fulbrighters was made by Professor Kobayashi.

The sample composition differed among the Japanese and American Fulbrighters. The Japanese sample consisted of the same group of Fulbrighters as the Kobayashi study, who were all graduate students at the time of their sojourn to the United States. An important consideration was that the findings of the two studies could be compared as appropriate. Accordingly, the questionnaires were sent to the 1,148 Japanese Fulbrighters who had responded to the study by Professor Kobayashi and colleagues. Because the total number of American Fulbrighters was much smaller, the questionnaires were sent to all those for whom addresses were available. The Japanese Fulbright Commission initiated a systematic updating of the 6,000 Japanese Fulbrighters in 1976, and it was successfully accomplished within a year (*The Fulbrighter,* #14, September 1991). The updating of the roster of American

Fulbrighters was initiated in 1989 but proved to be more difficult. As of September 1991, over 500 of the approximately 1,206 American Alumni were untraced. Many of these were unreachable because of death or address changes. (We received notification of the death of a Fulbrighter from a surviving spouse in a few cases in this study.) As of January 10, 1991, the total number of American Fulbrighters who had updated their addresses was 683. Altogether, questionnaires were sent out to 745 American Fulbrighters.

The questionnaires were sent out in summer 1991 in Japan and the United States. We had no absolute deadline for excluding returns, but the coding of the data was finished by the end of fall in 1991 in both countries. The total returns were composed of 88.9% men and 11.1% women among the Japanese Fulbrighters and 82.7% men and 17.3% women among the American Fulbrighters. The return rates of the questionnaires were higher for the Japanese Fulbrighters, at 68.7% (789 of 1148), than for the American Fulbrighters, at 49.5% (338 of 683 updated addresses) or 45.9% (338 of 745 mailed questionnaires). There are several factors that account for this. First, the Japanese Fulbrighters in the survey were all graduate students. Those at this early stage of their careers are more likely to be grateful for receiving a grant to study and, therefore, to respond to requests to participate in the survey. Second, the number of Japanese Fulbrighters coming to the United States was much larger during the earlier period when Japan was recovering from the physical and social disorganization of World War II. More than half (58.3%) of all Japanese Fulbrighters went to the United States in the decade of the 50s (1951 through 1959) compared to the 18% of American Fulbrighters who went to Japan in the same decade. The sense of gratitude and obligation of the early Japanese Fulbrighters is probably greater than that of the later grantees. The Japanese Fulbrighters of the 1950s were more likely to participate in the survey than those of the later decades. Because the Japan–United States Educational Commission is based in Tokyo, the Japanese Fulbrighters, in general, may have been more responsive to the request to participate made to all Japanese and American Fulbrighters.

The country differences in response rates also hold for returns from colleagues, although both rates are much lower than for the Fulbrighters; 361 Japanese colleagues or 31.4% (N = 1,148) and 142 American colleagues or 20.8% (N = 683) returned their questionnaires. The percentages were calculated on the assumption that each of the Fulbrighters gave the questionnaires to a colleague to fill out, as we had requested in a cover letter explaining the purpose of the study. We know that this assumption is not quite correct. Some Fulbrighters reported that they had not passed along the second questionnaire to a colleague. We suspect that this happened in many other un-

reported cases. A small number of Fulbrighters answered both questionnaires. In such cases, we kept only the Fulbrighter's questionnaire and discarded the one that was meant for a colleague. It was not feasible to send another questionnaire and request that the Fulbrighter pass it on to a colleague, since the respondents were not asked to provide their names, except as an option. If the returns by colleagues are divided by the number of Japanese and American Fulbrighters who participated in the survey, the rates of return by colleagues are similar: 45.7% for Japanese and 41.5% for American colleagues.

Japanese Fulbrighters who went to the United States in the 1950s (including a few GARIOA grantees) responded more than their proportionate share over time; they comprised 49.1% of all Japanese Fulbrighters and 58.3% of those who returned questionnaires. Those who went from 1960–69 were 35.4% of all Japanese Fulbrighters and 33% of those who responded. From 1970–79, the Japanese Fulbrighters represented 6% of the total and 3.9% of those who returned questionnaires; and from 1980–89, 9.1% of the total and 4.8% of those who returned questionnaires. American Fulbrighters who returned questionnaires were weighted toward recent awardees—42.4% of the returns came from Fulbrighters who went to Japan in the 1980–89 decade. The returns and proportions of American Fulbrighters for the other three decades were as follows: 1952–59, 26.7% of the total and 18% of the returns; 1960–69, 26.7% of the total and 20.3% of the returns; 1970–79, 18.2% of the total and 19.3% of the returns.

Over half of the Japanese Fulbrighters who returned questionnaires went to the United States when the relative position of the two countries was dramatically in favor of the United States. A typical response was that they went to the United States in its "golden period." The largest proportion of Americans in the sample went to Japan in the most recent decade—at a time when Japan had already developed into a very strong economic power. Interestingly, the Japanese women in the sample went disproportionately to the United States in the early decade, 51.9% (of all Japanese women Fulbrighters) in the 1950s, whereas American women went disproportionately to Japan in the most recent decade, 61% (of all American women Fulbrighters) in the 1980s. These differences in the period of tenure in the host country, as differentiated by sex, of Japanese and American Fulbrighters will be taken into account, as appropriate, in the analysis.

Background of Fulbrighters

Background information about the Fulbrighters provides us data to compare the Japanese and Americans' social origins. Income and occupational data

would have presented complex problems of comparability between the two societies, particularly since Japan and the United States were differently placed with regard to industrialization and urbanization.

PARENTS' LEVEL OF EDUCATION

The education achieved by the parents of the Fulbrighters also depends upon the status of education in both countries. Japanese education at the higher levels was less developed during the period, also. However, education levels could be ranked according to normal trends in both societies, and thus the relative ordering within each society can be known more simply (See Table 1). We asked both groups of Fulbrighters to check the educational attainment level of their fathers and mothers in terms of six ordered categories, starting with a "9th-grade education or less" and ending with "graduate or professional school."

The fathers of the Fulbrighters had comparable education: 50.5% of Japanese Fulbrighters and 46.6% of American Fulbrighters had fathers who were college graduates or had postgraduate education. The fathers of American Fulbrighters were more likely to have postgraduate education: 31.4%, compared to 8.9% for fathers of Japanese Fulbrighters. The mothers of American Fulbrighters were more likely to be college graduates or have more education (34.5%) than the mothers of Japanese Fulbrighters (14.8%). The educational advantage was more pronounced regarding graduate education; 16% of mothers of American Fulbrighters had some graduate education as compared to 1.6% of mothers of Japanese Fulbrighters.

GENDER AND PARENTS' EDUCATION

There were consistent sex differences among Fulbrighters in the educational backgrounds of their parents. Female Fulbrighters had parents with more education than male Fulbrighters. The fathers of American women Fulbrighters were slightly more likely to have a college education or better (58.2%) than were the fathers of Fulbright men (54.2%); 38.2% with graduate work or degree compared to 30%. The fathers of Japanese women Fulbrighters had a college degree or better in 64.7% of the cases, compared to 48.9% of the fathers of men Fulbrighters. The differences were larger regarding the education of the mothers. Half (50%) of the mothers of American women Fulbrighters had a college degree or better, compared with 30.3% of the mothers of American men Fulbrighters. Among Japanese Fulbrighters, 22.9% of the mothers of women Fulbrighters had college degrees or some graduate education compared to 13.6% of the mothers of men Fulbrighters. This consistent advantage in the higher level of parents' education for women Fulbrighters

Table 1
Percentage Distribution for Selected Demographic Variables: Japanese and American Fulbrighter Respondents

	Japanese Fulbrighters	American Fulbrighters
Sex		
males	88.9%	82.7%
females	11.1%	17.3%
Age (mean)	60.90	56.19
Age (mean) Fulbright Age	28.68	38.45
Occupation		
professional	57.1%	98.5%
proprietor	40.8%	—
sales	.1%	.3%
clerical	1.0%	—
skilled	.9%	—
other	—	1.2%
Cohort year		
1950s	58.1%	17.9%
1960s	33.1%	21.3%
1970s	4.0%	18.8%
1980s	4.8%	42.0%
Father's education		
9th grade or less	30.6%	15.8%
some high school	1.7%	9.3%
high school graduate	14.6%	16.5%
some college	2.6%	11.8%
college grad	41.6%	15.2%
grad/prof	8.9%	31.4%
Mother's education		
9th grade or less	38.9%	12.7%
some high school	1.2%	7.7%
high school graduate	42.8%	24.7%
some college	2.4%	20.4%
college grad	13.2%	18.5%
grad/prof	1.6%	16.0%

was also apparent at the graduate level for Japanese, although the percentages were smaller (2.4% of women Fulbrighters and 1.5% of men Fulbrighters had mothers with some graduate education). Women Fulbrighters in both Japan and the United States came from somewhat more advantaged educational backgrounds than did men Fulbrighters.

Education Level of Fulbrighters

All of the Japanese Fulbrighters in the sample went to the United States as graduate students. American Fulbrighters in the sample went to Japan in many capacities: 29.3% were researchers; 27.8%, lecturers; 19.5%, graduate students; 7.1%, teachers of English; 3.3%, other categories; and 13, not classifiable. Japanese Fulbrighters did not pursue graduate degrees to the same extent as the Americans. The highest degrees achieved were reported as follows: 37.2% of the Japanese and 75.7% of the Americans had doctorates; 33.8% of the Japanese and 12 of the Americans had master's degrees; 28.2% of the Japanese and 2.4% of the Americans reported undergraduate degrees. Since the undergraduate college is more important for initial job placement and advancement in Japan—to a much greater extent than in the United States—we classified the Japanese Fulbrighters in terms of the undergraduate colleges they attended. A large number (261) of the Japanese did not provide information about their undergraduate colleges. Of those who did, the vast majority (67.2%) took their degrees from the elite Japanese universities: the national universities of Hokkaido, Tohoku, Tokyo, Kyoto, Nagoya, Osaka, Kobe, Hiroshima, Kyushu, Ryukyu, and two private universities, Waseda and Keio. Other national universities were reported by 17% and other private universities by 13.8% of the responding Japanese Fulbrighters. The Fulbrighters were overrepresented as alumni of the elite colleges in Japan.

For the Americans, we classified the universities from which they received the highest degree in terms of a similar ranking of research universities. We took the top 20 universities out of 200 ranked in terms of research expenditures in 1989 (NSF *Academic Science/Engineering: R&D Expenditures, Fiscal Year 1989*, NSF 90-321, Detailed Statistical Tables, Washington, D.C., 1991), and added six other prestigious private universities not in the first 20: the University of Pennsylvania, Columbia, Yale, Chicago, California Institute of Technology, and Princeton. A second category was created of universities from the 20th to the 100th in the NSF ranked list—or the remaining top half of the 200 American universities ranked by research expenditures in 1989. Just over two-thirds of the American Fulbrighters (66.9%) received their advanced degrees at one of the top 26 research and/or important private univer-

sities. Another 19.7% received their degrees in the remaining 80 of the top half of research universities. These findings suggest that both the Japanese and American Fulbrighters received their important advanced education from elite institutions in their respective countries.

There are some differences in the universities attended by decade of study abroad in both the Japanese and American cohorts. The percentage of Japanese Fulbrighters graduating from the elite undergraduate colleges dropped from 71.1% in the 1950s cohort to 64.2% in the 1960s cohort, 57.9% in the 1970s cohort, and 51.9% in the 1980s cohort. The percentage of American Fulbrighters receiving their highest degrees from the elite universities was 70% or higher in the cohorts of 1950, 1960, and 1970, then dropped to 58.6% in the 1980s. Even in the 1980 cohort, a large majority of the American Fulbrighters received their important career-related education at the elite research universities in the United States.

Fields of Specialization

What were the areas of specialization, as evidenced by their highest degrees? The largest percentage among the Japanese were social scientists (including law majors), 46.9%; followed by humanities and arts specialists, 19%; engineers, 13%; physical scientists, 9.7%; and health scientists, 8.4%. Among the Americans, the largest percentage were also social scientists, 46.2%, followed by humanities and arts specialists, 34.9%; business majors and lawyers, 10.4%; and physical and biological scientists (including medicine), 8.6%. The Japanese Fulbrighters had larger proportions of engineers and health scientists, whereas the American Fulbrighters had larger proportions of humanities and arts specialists, business specialists and lawyers. The only significant difference in specialties of the Japanese Fulbrighters over time was the appearance of physical scientists only in the 1950s cohort. Among the American Fulbrighters, there were no consistent trends for the two largest groups: the social scientists and the humanities and arts specialists. The numbers were very small for the other categories, but there was a large representation of lawyers in the 1980s, 21 compared to 5 in the earlier three decades.

There were some differences in the present occupations of the two groups of Fulbrighters. If retired, we asked them to provide information about their major occupation prior to retirement. The American Fulbrighters were mainly professors in universities or researchers; fully 98.5% of them were professionals. The Japanese Fulbrighters were more diversified: 57.1% were

professionals and 40.8% were managers or proprietors. There were sex differences in occupational distribution only for Japanese Fulbrighters: a larger percentage of women were employed as professionals (74.4%) than were the men (55.1%), and there were fewer managers among the women (19.2%) compared to the men (43.3%).

There were also differences in the contexts in which the Fulbrighters were employed. Among the Japanese Fulbrighters, 47.8% were employed in universities or colleges, 32% were employed in private industry, and 11% were employed in government. Among the Americans, 80.5% were employed in universities or colleges, 8.5% in private industry, and 1.5% in government. The sex differences were apparent only for Japanese Fulbrighters: In line with the occupational differences, more men worked in the private sector or government, whereas more women worked in the academic world.

Experiences Abroad

The Fulbright experience was not the only tenure abroad in the other country for study, research, or teaching. Many of the Japanese Fulbrighters were able to spend more than the Fulbright-sponsored year in the United States by winning assistantships or fellowships. Both American and Japanese Fulbrighters spent considerable time in education-related activities in Japan and the United States in addition to their Fulbright tenure. The average times spent in Japan by American Fulbrighters and in the United States by Japanese Fulbrighters are comparable, with the mean periods of time being 30.5 months for American Fulbrighters and 28 months for Japanese Fulbrighters. Only 32% of the Japanese Fulbrighters and 29% of the American Fulbrighters spent a year or less in the United States and Japan (5% of the American Fulbrighters spent 5 months or less in Japan); 33% of Japanese Fulbrighters and 35% of American Fulbrighters spent from 13 months to two years in each other's country; and 38% of both Japanese and American Fulbrighters spent more than two years in each other's country. In sum, many of the Fulbrighters spent significant periods of time in career-related activities in each other's country.

Age and Family Status During Fulbright Period

The age at which they received their Fulbright award is an important factor in the impact of the sojourn experience. The Japanese Fulbrighters were younger at the time of first award, with a mean age of 29 (range of 20 to 53 years) compared to a mean age of 38 for American Fulbrighters (range of 21 to 68 years).

Another important aspect of their sojourns abroad was whether they were accompanied by family. The Japanese Fulbrighters were much more likely to experience their sojourn in the United States alone. Among the Japanese Fulbrighters, 70.1% traveled to the United States alone—either single persons or by leaving their wives and family behind; 18.6% went with family and 11.3% had visits from family. Among the Americans, only 9.5% traveled to Japan alone; 86% traveled with family and 4.5% had visits from family. The percentage of Japanese Fulbrighters accompanied by family increased over the decades, so that by the 1980s almost half (48%) of Japanese Fulbrighters were accompanied by their families. There were no differences in the proportions of American Fulbrighters who were accompanied by their wives during the decades. Women Fulbrighters, both Japanese and American, were more often "never married" than men Fulbrighters (15% to 2.9% for Japanese women and men, and 25.5% to 6.3% for American women and men).

Fulbright Host Campus Site

What were the institutional contexts in which the Japanese Fulbrighters and American Fulbrighters spent their sojourns abroad in the United States and Japan? Schwantes (1955) reports that it was the policy to spread Japanese students among universities in the United States rather than to concentrate them (p. 20). It is interesting, therefore, that more than half of the Japanese Fulbrighters (53.5%) studied at universities in the United States that ranked the 20 highest in research expenditures—plus the six highly regarded private institutions—and another 25.3% studied at the next level of 74 universities ranked in terms of research expenditures in 1989. The American Fulbrighters were similarly situated, with 64.1% placed at the elite national and private Japanese universities, and 11.7% more at the next level of national universities. In sum, most of the Japanese and American Fulbrighters spent their sojourns abroad in the best institutions of the host country. For the Japanese Fulbrighters, their tenure in the elite American universities increased from 48.7% in the 1950s to 58.1% in the 1960s and to 66.7% in both the 1970s and 1980s. There were no changes over the decades in the proportions of American Fulbrighters who spent their tenure in the elite Japanese institutions. Japanese women Fulbrighters were less likely (43%) than men Fulbrighters (54.6%) to be situated in the elite institutions, more likely to be situated in other private colleges or universities (19.8% to 12.8%), and more likely to be situated in all other institutions (37.2% to 32.7%). American women Fulbrighters were also less likely (53.7%) to be situated in the elite Japanese universities than men (66.8%), more likely to be placed in other

private and other institutions (13% to 10.5%), and more likely to be placed in other institutions (33.4% to 22.7%).

Degrees Received During Fulbright Period

Since the Japanese Fulbrighters in this survey were all graduate students, a greater percentage reported receiving degrees in the United States. Among the Japanese, 1.4% received undergraduate degrees and 41.2% received graduate degrees. Among the Americans, 8.9% reported receiving graduate degrees from Japanese institutions. Even if we computed this only for Americans who went as graduate students to Japan, the percentage is only 12.1% (8 out of 66). The Japanese Fulbrighters benefitted more in terms of receiving advanced degrees from their educational sojourns than did the American Fulbrighters. There were no differences by sex in the receipt of degrees by Japanese and American Fulbrighters. The Japanese Fulbrighters of the latter decades were more likely to receive graduate degrees in the United States than in the earlier decades (28.7% in the 1950s, 56.3% in the 1960s, 70% in the 1970s, and 63.9% in the 1980s).

Objectives in Going Abroad

What were the reasons Fulbrighters gave for seeking educational experiences overseas in the United States and Japan? Earlier studies of Japanese students who had studied in Europe and the United States suggested that they were generally of two types: those sponsored by the government to study in the advanced societies in order to acquire the education and skills to propel Japan into the ranks of the great powers (Schwantes, 1955, p. 194) and the "outsiders" or the "alienated" (Bennett et al., pp. 34–40, 84–87). The former were mainstream persons and represented the majority of those going abroad. The latter were fewer in number and included different types. Some were individuals whose experiences oriented them to the world outside of Japan; for example, Christians. Others were the children of the rich and powerful in Japan. A third type were the politically deviant—those of leftist orientation. Some educated women who felt constrained by the rigid gender role requirements of Japanese society were a fourth category of outsider (Schwantes, pp. 196–7).

Given the situation in Japan right after World War II, it is probable that most individuals applying for GARIOA and Fulbright awards were dominated by pragmatic motivations to gain appropriate skills to assist in the reconstruc-

tion of Japan. There may have been a few "alienated" amongst the Japanese Fulbrighters, but most were those with professional motivations.

The situation for the American Fulbrighters applying to study, conduct research, or teach in Japan was different. For researchers and graduate students, this was an important opportunity to conduct research in a country that was already selected as their area of expertise. Their motivations were probably professional and pragmatic. Explorations of another culture or other life-styles may have motivated the American lecturers.

Motivations for Fulbright Participation

In order to assess the motivations of the Fulbrighters, a list of 10 objectives ranging from "obtain professional knowledge and skills" and "learn about the United States/Japan" to "increase international good will" was provided for the respondents to rank in importance from one to three. The rankings and the percentage endorsement of the different objectives were similar for both groups of Fulbrighters. For the first objective, 42.6% of Japanese and 52% of American Fulbrighters checked obtaining professional knowledge and skills; 16% of Japanese and 26.3% of Americans checked learn about the United States/Japan; and 4.5% of Japanese and 2.8% of the Americans were interested in studying the other country's language. For the second objective, 23.6% of Japanese and 20.1% of the Americans checked increase opportunities for future professional growth; 15.4% of the Japanese and 16.2% of the Americans checked learn about the United States/Japan; and 16.2% of Japanese and 10.8% of Americans were interested in studying the other's language. For the third objective, 13.5% of Japanese and 14.7% of Americans checked increase opportunities for future professional growth; 12.5% of Japanese and 14.1% of Americans checked learn about the United States/Japan; and 17.3% of Japanese and 20.5% of Americans checked acquire English/Japanese language skills. Professional and utilitarian objectives were chosen as primary objectives by both groups of Fulbrighters. Still, about a quarter of Japanese and a fifth of American Fulbrighters included broader objectives among their third priorities: 22.6% of Japanese and 7.5% of Americans checked "gain experience and world view," and 4.5% of Japanese and 12.1% of Americans checked "increase international goodwill."

Most Fulbrighters from both countries reported that they had managed to accomplish their three main objectives by at least 75% of their expectations: 84.1%, 78.2%, and 74.2% of the Japanese and 85.4%, 78%, and 76.4% of the Americans, for the first, second, and third objectives.

Were there differences in the motivations of the Fulbrighters according to the time period of their educational sojourns? Looking at the objective they had ordered as their first priority, there are no differences among the Americans. Among the Japanese, the earliest cohort of the 1950s had the largest percentage (22.6%) of those who said they wanted to learn about the United States as their first priority. The highest percentage listing this as their first objective in the other cohorts was 7.6% for the 1960s group. The most recent cohort of the Japanese, the 1980s, had the largest percentage (33.3%) who were seeking degrees in the United States. As noted earlier, all Japanese Fulbrighters in this study went as graduate students to the United States. The American Fulbrighters in this sample went to Japan in several different capacities and their objectives vary accordingly. Graduate students and researchers were more likely to check "obtain professional knowledge and skills" as their first objective than the others (61.5% and 59.4%). American lecturers and teachers of English were more likely to check "learn about Japan" as the first objective (51.1% and 52.2%).

Encounter With Host Country Social Patterns

Adjustment to a foreign country is difficult at best. Lack of facility in the host-country language is isolating psychologically and compounds the logistical problems of daily living. Even though the earlier cohorts went to each other's country by ship and were provided a program of orientation en route, these served, at best, merely as an introduction to the problems of adjustment that ensued. For most of the Fulbrighters, both Japanese and American, lack of fluency in the host-country language made entry and adjustment to the other culture even more difficult. More than half of the Americans (56.9%) and almost half of the Japanese (49.4%) reported that language difficulties made it difficult to carry out their projects. Still, 60.4% of Americans and 36.7% of the Japanese reported that they felt comfortable and relaxed about living in Japan and the United States within a month. By the end of six months, 92% of Japanese and 94.7% of Americans reached that state of adjustment. At the other extreme, 4.1% of Americans and 7.1% of the Japanese reported that it took them from six months to one year to feel comfortable in the host country. A very small percentage of both groups of Fulbrighters (1.3% of Americans and 0.9% of the Japanese) never felt comfortable or relaxed in the host country. These self-reports testify to the reality of cultural differences between the two countries.

The same question was asked about how long it took the Fulbrighter to feel comfortable and relaxed after returning home. As might be expected, this

process was somewhat more rapid than when the Fulbrighter went to the host country. More than half (52.7%) of the Japanese reported that the process of adjusting comfortably to home-country ways occurred within a few days to a month; the comparable percentage for Americans was 68.7%. For about a tenth (9.6%) of Japanese Fulbrighters and less than a twentieth (4.1%) of American Fulbrighters, the process took several years or they were still not comfortable in their own countries after the sojourn abroad. This suggests that the Fulbright experience was somewhat more consequential for Japanese Fulbrighters than for American Fulbrighters.

There were no differences by cohorts of American or Japanese Fulbrighters with regard to time required to adjust comfortably to the host country and to the home country upon their return. However, there were gender differences. American women were more likely than men to report taking a longer time to feel comfortable and relaxed in Japan. There was no comparable difference among Japanese women and men in their adjustment to American society. However, greater percentages of both Japanese and American women as compared to their men colleagues reported taking longer than one month to feel comfortable and relaxed on their return. American women probably reacted more strongly to the subordinate position of women in Japan, even if their foreigner status permitted them more psychological space than was available to Japanese women. Japanese women who experienced the more equal status of women in the United States may have found it difficult to adjust to subordinate gender roles of women in Japan upon their return home.

Social Relations and Perceptions During Fulbright Period

To what extent did both groups encounter specific types of social relationships in the host country and how did they react to them? The reality of different social patterns in the United States and Japan is recognized by laypersons and scholars. It is more difficult to conceptualize, operationalize, and measure the differences. We took the more common perceptions of social patterns in both countries as noted by a number of experts (Nakane, 1970; Lebra and Lebra [eds.], 1986; Benedict, 1946; Bennett et al., 1958; Christopher, 1983; and Austin, 1975.) A representative summary of the different communication styles of Japanese and Americans is provided in a recent study (Barnlund, 1989, pp. 190–191). The author states:

> The Japanese are likely to be startled at the ease with which Americans approach and enter into intense conversations with people they scarcely know. Americans' lack of sensitivity to protocol and to status

differences, or their deliberate efforts to undermine them, may appear naive or downright insulting. Their constant questions and revealing disclosure may seem intrusive and overbearing, forcing the Japanese to discuss matters they regard as private. The extent to which Americans recount their experiences, failures, and successes may sound self-centered and pompous. Their informality and impulsiveness may deprive social occasions of their congenial predictability. The pace at which Americans move and talk, their verbal and physical flamboyance, may be unnerving. Their eagerness to contradict, even to argue bluntly, disturbs the harmony that should prevail. Equally astonishing is their ability to engage in such conflicts without it impairing their feeling for each other. Their endless analyzing, insistence on verbal precision, and binding agreements reveal an incredible trust in words over people. They are prone to error because they are always in such a hurry. . . .

The Americans, in turn, confront Japanese who appear reluctant to meet strangers and slow to get to know them. The Japanese seem preoccupied with the relative status of people and are constantly deferring to those above them. They also are constantly apologizing. They seem to view conversation as some sort of formal ceremony rather than a real meeting of the minds. They are reticent about saying much about themselves, preferring to comment on superficial and irrelevant topics. When questions are put directly to them the answers are so vague that one has little idea of where they stand. They all repeat the same things as if fearful of disagreement. They are as physically opaque as they are verbally—except when drinking—and rarely show feelings of any kind, particularly negative ones. They are composed in the way they sit, the way they stand, the way they talk, as if some accidental and uncalculated act might expose them. There is a reluctance to dig into problems, analyze them step by step, and agree on specific solutions. And they seem oblivious to deadlines. . . .

These excerpts may overdramatize the context of Japanese encountering Americans in the United States and Americans encountering Japanese in Japan, but the major themes developed in the two scenarios are found in most studies of Japanese and American societies. They are also noticed in the experiences of the Fulbrighters.

Among the Japanese, the following comments were offered about their time in the United States: .

It was not living in a structured society that was the most significant thing. I was impressed with the ease with which one could make friendships with people one met or respected, particularly across ages. I had always felt inhibited by the code of behavior in Japan. . . .The sense of justice in the United States is very different. Now that I am

a senior professor, I try to act toward my junior colleagues in a more equal manner" (professor of economics).

Personally, I think I became an independent woman. Because I saw young Americans, both men and women, they didn't depend on their parents. They worked during their college vacations, some paid their own fees. The girls were rather dependent, but the boys were very independent and I was very much impressed, compared with our young people, including me (professor of English literature, woman).

Very frankly speaking, for many years since I came back from the United States, I didn't realize that my way of thinking or my life-style had been influenced by my stay in the United States for two years. But after I started my business, I have had a chance to think about how well-off I am now. I realized how deeply affected I was. . . .This way of thinking—basically should be frank and honest and straight. This is the basic principle I learned (former executive in a corporation, now operating his own company).

American Fulbrighters were also quite outspoken about those elements in Japanese society that seemed to "irritate" them. For example, one of the things that a number of American Fulbrighters commented upon was the "tightness" of Japanese society and the subordinate position of women, of "sexism."

There were numbers of great contrast. I felt the tightness of Japanese society—all the *giri*—everybody had to pay back. Professor T. took us everywhere and looked after me. We decided to undertake a non-competitive party for them. My wife got perfume for Mrs. T. and I bought a book for him and we invited them for dinner. We thought we had succeeded. Then just a few weeks later, we were invited to a lavish New Year's party. Mrs. T. got my wife a — and Professor T. gave me a book that was a half-inch thicker than mine. This continued this way until Professor T.'s father got ill and they were busy with his care. Even then, Mrs. T. came to the train to see us off (professor of religion, emeritus).

Particularly, I have found that assertiveness and aggressiveness, which are valued traits in a lawyer in the United States, are counter-productive in Japan. Instead, an air of haughtiness or, stated more positively, self-assuredness are effective substitutes. This is "hierarchical" in the sense that it is proper behavior for one with "sensei" status such as a lawyer (lawyer, practicing in Japan).

A woman physician was quite concerned about the sexism she noticed when she accompanied her husband to Japan in 1959. She spoke about its con-

tinued persistence and mentioned the example of a former Japanese student of hers, who spent time in England and liked the informal relationships between husbands and wives he found there. He tried for two years to establish that pattern upon his return to Japan, but gave up after meeting with no success. She did report, however, that wives of Japanese scientists were invited to more recent scientific meetings in Japan, at which she accompanied her husband, about five years ago.

The themes that we chose to represent American and Japanese society are listed in Tables 2 and 3.

Japanese Perceptions of American Society

We asked the Japanese to check the degree to which they observed ("a lot," "some," "little," "not at all") and evaluated ("positive" to "negative" in five ordered steps) the American social patterns. Similarly, we asked the Americans about their observation and assessment of Japanese social patterns. We should note that there were some objections to the way in which this question was asked in the questionnaire. A number wrote that a questionnaire format did not do justice to the complexity of the social and cultural patterns of the United States and Japan. We are aware of these objections and of other methods of analysis. Nonetheless, a survey provides data that can be quantified and thus add to the understanding of social and cultural configurations.

Table 2
Extent to Which American Social Patterns Were Observed by Japanese Fulbrighters

Social Pattern	A lot	Some	Little	Not at all
1. Informality in personal relations	65.7%	31.6%	2.3%	0.3%
2. Frankness of expression	57.5	39.2	3.2	0.1
3. Equality of men and women	44.5	44.2	9.9	1.3
4. Emphasis on the individual	56.7	38.2	4.5	0.7
5. Participation by many ethnic groups in all sectors of society	10.6	42.6	37.4	9.4
6. General indifference to age and hierarchy in personal relations	23.6	54.3	18.6	3.5

The types of social patterns checked as having been observed a lot in the United States by the Japanese Fulbrighters were: informality in personal relations, 65.7%; frankness of expression, 57.5%; and emphasis on the individual, 56.7%. Less than half checked "a lot" for the other social patterns: equality of men and women, 44.5%; general indifference to age and hierarchy in personal relations, 23.6%; and participation by many ethnic groups in all sectors of society, 10.6%. If the first two categories of "a lot" and "some" are combined, then all of these patterns were observed by the vast majority of the Japanese Fulbrighters, with the smallest percentage observing the inclusion of ethnic groups in all sectors of American society, 53.2%. The general ordering seems rather consistent with the empirical patterns as noted by expert observers—both American and foreign—previously cited.

American Perceptions of Japanese Society

What about the perceptions by Americans of Japanese social patterns? Considering the patterns that were observed a lot, the Americans put "separation of roles of men and women" first (64.4%), followed by "emphasis on individual's affiliation" (54.5%).

Table 3
Extent to Which Japanese Social Patterns Were Observed by American Fulbrighters

Social Pattern	A lot	Some	Little	Not at all
1. Formality/reserve in personal relations	34.3%	49.1%	13.8%	2.8%
2. Vagueness of expression	26.8	50.5	18.8	3.8
3. Separation of roles of men and women	64.4	30.0	4.4	1.3
4. Emphasis on individual's affiliation	54.5	33.9	9.0	2.6
5. Difficulty of *gaijin* and minorites to be accepted in Japanese society	21.7	39.2	28.8	10.4
6. Consciousness of age and hierarchical status in personal relations	38.0	45.6	13.9	2.5

If those who perceived "a lot" and "some" are combined, then all of these Japanese social patterns were observed by more than 6 out of 10 American Fulbrighters. It also appears that the Japanese respondents noticed the correlated social patterns in the United States more frequently than did the Americans, except for the last two statements that dealt with acceptance of minorities and the importance of age in both societies. The Americans were more likely to notice the difficulties for foreigners to be accepted in Japanese society than the Japanese were to see the participation by ethnic groups in all sectors of American society. The situation of the outsider in Japanese society is still quite problematic and noticeable. The changes in inclusion of ethnic groups in American society have increased since the time of the first Japanese Fulbrighters in 1952.

The only one of the social patterns for which there is a statistically significant difference in observation by Japaanese cohorts is the inclusion of ethnic groups in American society, where more than a fifth (22.2% of the 1980s cohort) observed this as compared to 1 in 10 of the earlier three cohorts. It is interesting, however, that there was a drop in the percentage of cohorts of 1970 and 1980 who observed the informality in American society to one-half compared to two-thirds of the cohorts of 1950 and 1960. Perhaps there has been a change toward greater informality among the younger Japanese cohorts and so their perception of that same factor in American society has become less salient. There were no differences by sex in the extent to which the Japanese Fulbrighters observed the different American social patterns.

The percentage of the American cohorts who checked that they observed a lot of formality/reserve in personal relations were: 1950s cohort, 31.6%; 1960s cohort, 39.1%; 1970s cohort, 23.3.%; and 1980s cohort, 40.5%. The 1960s and 1980s cohorts were more struck by this aspect of Japanese society than the cohorts of 1950 or 1970. The 1960s cohort had the largest percentage (73.4%) checking that they observed a lot the "separation of roles of men and women," although this was observed by more than a majority in each of the other three cohorts. There were no differences by sex in the observation of the different Japanese social patterns.

Evaluations of Each Others' Society

In addition to observing the social patterns of the host country, we were interested in understanding how the Fulbrighters evaluated them, positively or negatively. The assessment of the other country's social patterns is another distinct dimension of their intercultural experience. It has been suggested,

by Western social scientists (Barnlund, 1989), that the experience of going from a more hierarchical, group-oriented, rigid, tighter society to a more equal, individualistic, flexible, looser society is easier than the transition in the other direction. Although the difficulties may be more equivalent in the short run regardless of the direction, the hypothesis is probably accurate in the longer term for societies moving toward greater respect for the individual. Most contemporary observers note this trend in Japan since World War II. It appears to be the case that Japanese Fulbrighters, going from the tighter and group-conforming home society to a looser, individualistic host society were much more positive in their overall evaluations of all American social patterns than were the Americans about Japanese social patterns. The Japanese Fulbrighters evaluated most positively the social patterns of informality in personal relations (68.2%), followed by the emphasis on the individual (64.7%), frankness of expression (59%), and equality of men and women (50.3%). The two social patterns receiving the fewest of the "most positive" assessment (although more than a majority were positive) were inclusion of ethnic groups (34.8%) and indifference to age attributes (30.2%). A multiethnic society is distant from the experiences of Japanese who live in a homogeneous society, and respect for age is still more important in Japan than in the United States. There were no differences in the assessment of the American social patterns by cohort or by sex for the Japanese Fulbrighters.

The assessment of Japanese social patterns by American Fulbrighters presents a very different picture. None of the Japanese social patterns were evaluated positively by the Americans. The most negatively evaluated were gender segregation (23.8%) and the difficulties of *gaijin* (foreigners) and minorities in being accepted in Japanese society (20.3%). If the two negative categories are combined, more than 60% of the Americans viewed these social patterns negatively. The complexity of these assessments is suggested by the fact that 37.9% of American Fulbrighters made positive evaluations about formality/reserve in personal relations and 25.1% about consciousness of age and hierarchical status in personal relationships. A large number of Americans were quite favorably impressed with these distinctive social patterns of social distance and hierarchy not often seen as configurations esteemed by Americans.

There were differences by decade cohorts in the assessment of the Japanese social patterns by American Fulbrighters. There was an increase in the negative assessment of the separate roles of men and women from 54.6% by the 1950s cohort to 70.5% by the 1980s cohort; an increase in the negative assessment of the emphasis on an individual's affiliation from 26.9% by the 1950s cohort to 40.9% by the 1980s cohort; an increase in the negative as-

sessment of the difficulty of *gaijin* and minorities to be accepted in Japanese society from 42.6% by the 1950s cohort to 75.2% by the 1980s cohort. The explanations for these differences are probably quite complex. The increase in sensitivity to gender segregation may be the result of greater expectations on the part of Americans who experienced changes in their own society toward gender parity while there was very little change in Japan. The two other increases in negative assessment probably result also from a complex interplay of heightened expectations by Americans and the lack of any real change in Japanese society in these two contexts of social interaction.

Educational Experiences and Consequences

The Fulbrighters brought behavioral tendencies with them as they went about their educational tasks. We were interested in knowing the impact of the home-country background on the implementation and achievement of their educational projects overseas. We asked questions about language difficulty, bureaucratic procedures, aggressiveness/cautiousness in approaching subjects, and direct/indirect way of responding by Americans/Japanese. Not all of the characteristics were relevant to the projects of all of the Fulbrighters. For example, American lecturers in Japan taught in English, and ability in speaking and understanding Japanese was not a problem in the success of their projects. To take account of this factor, we provided a category of "not relevant" for endorsement. As expected, American Fulbrighters chose this category more frequently than Japanese Fulbrighters. American Fulbrighters marked the "not relevant" category in proportions ranging from 39.2%

Table 4
Influence of American Cultural Factors on Project of Japanese Fulbrighter

	Hinders	Facilitates	Not Relevant
1. Difficulty of the English language	58.2%	41.8%	651
2. Complex bureaucratic procedures in U.S.	7.3	92.7	602
3. Difficulties in getting subjects to respond	8.6	91.4	535
4. Suggestions to be more aggressive by American colleagues	13.8	86.2	486
5. Direct way of response by Americans	21.0	79.0	566

(difficulty of the Japanese language) to 79.2% (suggestions to be cautious by Japanese colleagues). Japanese Fulbrighters chose the "not relevant" categories in proportions ranging from 15% (difficulty of the English language) to 35.5% (suggestions to be more aggressive by American colleagues). Tables 4 and 5 that show the percentages reporting a factor as hindering or facilitating their projects have been calculated by excluding the "not relevant" and missing cases.

The characteristic that seems to have been problematic among a majority of Japanese Fulbrighters was difficulty in English. The other factors were seen by 79% or more of the Japanese Fulbrighters as facilitating their projects in the United States. These responses may indicate that the Japanese Fulbrighters made persistent efforts to carry out their projects by consciously utilizing American ways as well as by operating by their own social patterns, and were reasonably successful.

The responses of the American Fulbrighters present a rather different pattern. The only factor that more than a majority of Americans reported facilitated their projects was "suggestions to be cautious by Japanese colleagues." All of the other factors were reported by 85% or more to have hindered their projects. A much larger percentage of American Fulbrighters reported difficulty with the Japanese language as hindering their projects than did Japanese Fulbrighters about English.

Table 5
Influence of Japanese Cultural Factors on Project of American Fulbrighters

	Hinders	Facilitates	Not Relevant
1. Difficulty of the Japanese language	93.7%	6.3%	190
2. Complex bureaucratic procedures	86.2	13.8	145
3. Difficulties in getting subjects to respond	86.2	13.8	116
4. Suggestions to be cautious by Japanese colleagues	44.6	55.4	65
5. Indirecct way of response by Japanese	86.6	13.4	119

These responses need to be viewed along with their assessments about the influence of three internalized cultural factors that may have come into play in carrying out their projects. For Japanese Fulbrighters, these were (a) deliberateness and caution, (b) need to develop trust over time, and (c) deference to formal authority. For American Fulbrighters, these were (a) aggressiveness and impatience, (b) assuming trust and direct agreement with Japanese on first meeting, and (c) informality in interpersonal relations. We asked them to respond whether these characteristics hindered, facilitated, or were not relevant in carrying out their Fulbright projects.

As with the cultural factors in the host country, greater proportions of American Fulbrighters (62.7%, 49.2%, 41%, respectively) reported that these American characteristics were "not relevant" than did Japanese Fulbrighters (31.5%, 33.6%, 35.8%) about the three Japanese cultural factors. The not relevant responses were excluded to see what factors hindered and facilitated the projects. Among the Japanese, the characteristic of deference to formal authority was reported by 85.7% to have facilitated their projects; need to develop trust over time by 61.5%, and deliberateness and caution by 59%. For the American Fulbrighters, 89.3% reported that informality in interpersonal relations facilitated their projects, as did 77.5% about the American tendency to assume trust on first meeting. But more than three quarters (75.2%) reported that aggressiveness and impatience hindered them in carrying out their projects. There were no differences in the response patterns by cohort or by gender for either group of Fulbrighters.

Most of the Japanese felt that both their internalized characteristics and the American cultural factors they encountered in their sojourn facilitated their carrying out their Fulbright projects. The experiences of the American Fulbrighters were different. A majority of Americans reported that two internalized characteristics and one factor they encountered in Japan facilitated their projects. But one internalized characteristic and four factors encountered in Japan by Americans were reported to have hindered the carrying out of their projects. It appears the Americans were more frustrated in their educational projects by these factors than were the Japanese. These experiences, however, did not impact on the very positive evaluation of Fulbright experiences by both American and Japanese Fulbrighters. These findings detail the complex interaction of socialized behavioral tendencies and host-country social patterns in the project experiences of Japanese and American Fulbrighters.

Perceptions of Higher Education

Since the Fulbrighters were involved centrally with colleges and universities

on their sojourns (except for professionals such as journalists in the most recent period), we were interested in their perceptions of aspects of higher education in the host country. We asked both groups to evaluate university education in the host country in terms of several characteristics: (a) rigor of demands, (b) informality (about American universities)/formality (about Japanese universities) of professor and student relations, (c) teaching factual materials, (d) facilitating creativity of students, and (e) facilitating creativity of faculty. They were asked to indicate their assessment in terms of five categories: very good, good, poor, very poor, and don't know. The Japanese Fulbrighters were much more favorable in their evaluation of American university education than the Americans were of Japanese university education. The positive responses—very good plus good—ranged from 86.1% to 97.2% by the Japanese Fulbrighters about American universities, and from 16% to 54.3% by American Fulbrighters about Japanese universities. Perhaps this is an example of the disinclination of Japanese Fulbrighters to say anything negative, noted by Peter Rose in his study of Fulbrighters (1976, p. 16). However, expert opinion of both Japanese and Americans is that the Japanese university system is not as rigorous and effective as the American university system (Christopher, 1983, pp. 92–100; Reischauer, E. in Duke, 1986; Vogel, 1980, p. 162.; and Amano, 1992, p. 6). The Japanese Fulbrighters checked "very good" by percentages ranging from 39.4% about facilitating creativity to 58.2% about informality of professor–student relations. The American Fulbrighters checked "very good" by percentages ranging from 1.7% about facilitating creativity of students to 15.2% about teaching factual materials in Japanese universities. It is interesting that the characteristic endorsed the most as "very good" by Japanese Fulbrighters is an aspect of student–professor relationships in the United States rather than of the teaching/research process. American Fulbrighters endorse "very good" the most about the teaching of factual materials in Japanese universities.

There were no differences by cohort among the Japanese Fulbrighters in their assessments of American universities. Among the American Fulbrighters, there was a tendency for the younger cohorts to be less positive in their assessments of each of the characteristics. For example, 18.9% of the 1950s American cohort checked "very good" regarding rigor of demands in Japanese university education, whereas only 3.3% of the 1980s cohort checked that category. There were no differences by gender for the Japanese and American Fulbrighters in their evaluation of the university systems.

Impact on Professional Life

Finally, we asked each Fulbrighter to evaluate the impact of the Fulbright ex-

perience on his/her professional life, family life, and personal life by checking one of five ordered categories ranging from "very negative to "very positive." The Fulbrighters were overwhelmingly positive with respect to the impact of the Fulbright experience on their professional lives; 52.7% of Japanese and 63.2% of American Fulbrighters checked the most positive category. The impact on their personal lives was most positively endorsed by 22.5% of Japanese and 37.9% of American Fulbrighters. The impact on their family lives was most positively endorsed by 22.5% of Japanese Fulbrighters and 24.5% of American Fulbrighters. There was only one significant difference by cohort or by gender. American women were more likely (77.2%) to choose "very positive" than American men (60.6%) about the impact of the Fulbright experience on their professional lives.

Identity and Life-Style

Living in another society for any length of time, particularly societies as different as Japan and the United States, is bound to impact on the core of an individual's identity, his/her sense of self as a person. There is abundant testimony of such consequences in the literature of intercultural contacts. Previously cited studies on the international exchange of students point to the role of "felt and accorded national status" (DuBois, 1958, p. 39) on "self-esteem." Bennett et al. (1958, p. 85) raise this issue sharply with respect to the "alienee":

> It is clear that when a Japanese leaves his country at a relatively young age, without strong ties and promises of a secure career, and remains for a relatively long period in the United States, he is likely to lose some identification with Japan and to gain a corresponding identity with America. He also becomes more 'American' in his behavior and outlook. Finally, after returning to Japan, and discovering that he is removed from the ordinary pathways of achievement, he will probably strive to accomplish his goals in an individualistic, competitive manner, which in terms of Japanese definitions of the situation means to be 'Americanized.'

Bennett and colleagues find similar problems for the other types in their study, the "idealist" and the "adjustor." The resolution of the identity problem is easier for the "adjustor" who kept his Japanese identity while in the United States and returns to an established position in Japan (pp. 136–153). And the alienated and idealist come to terms with their Japanese identity if their social status is confirmed and validated over the years by a secure occupational position. It is a complex process of self-disruption and reconstruction that we are trying to describe.

Japanese and American Fulbrighters in interviews and written comments addressed this process. Descriptions of this process from both groups are presented in the following quotes.

A female Japanese Fulbrighter, now a college professor, states:

> My experience in the United States made me conscious that I was incurably Japanese, especially in minute daily habits, in spite of the fact that I found it hard to leave the country at the end of my stay.

A Japanese professor of engineering emphasizes that:

> The Fulbright experience in the United States in no way influenced my identity as a Japanese. After the Fulbright study, I spent one year in Japan . . . and then stayed in the United States for the subsequent eight years. Still, I did not have the faintest feeling that I was someone other than a Japanese . . . My ego as a Japanese cozily coexisted with my ego as a permanent resident in the United States.

A Japanese economist and insurance executive provided his view and perceptions of his friends:

> I myself think that my identity as a Japanese had not been affected at all by the Fulbright experience in the United States. But, some of my friends who have no experience in the United States might think I had been partially Americanized. I frankly do not know an objective answer.

A Japanese professor of economics details the complexity of the process.

> During my three-and-a-half-year experience in the United States as a graduate student, I feel I went through a psychological transformation to become less 'Japanese.' Or more precisely, I think I found more of what I could not subscribe to in the Japanese social values, and I began to try to separate myself from being a Japanese. For example, I did not like the strong social pressure for conformity, discouraging the exercise of individualism and the lack of respect for human dignity. Partially due to my earlier personal experiences in Japan, I had felt vaguely that these points were causes that had made me somewhat deviant in traditional Japanese community.
>
> I had never been very conscious that I was a Japanese, but after my experience in the United States, I positively began to try to avoid identifying myself as a Japanese. My Japaneseness is my natural ascription, not the quality of my choice. Then what do I identify myself with? I am trying to be a human being who places more value to reason, humanity and tolerance than nationalism or obedience to authority.

And among the Americans:

A linguist who had extensive overseas experience would have rated his ex-

perience in Japan as a 40 on a "scale of exoticism from 1 to 10," compared to a 5 for France and 10 for the USSR. He concludes:

> I think the experience gave me yet another yardstick to measure our country by. Whenever I return to the United States (as I have just now) from a long stay elsewhere, I'm struck by how we differ and how well in some ways—and how badly in others—we compare with the rest of the world. And I'm mighty happy to be back home in what to me is the best country in the world—the one where one can make the most of oneself.

A political scientist who specializes in Japanese studies said that his trips to Japan affected his identity. . .

> . . . a lot. One of my earlier trips to Japan was during the Vietnam War. I was quite critical of the U.S. position, but I found that when I was there, I identified with the American position. It wasn't exactly being defensive; I explained the American position to the Japanese. It strengthens one's feeling of identity with one's own country, sharpens one's perception . . . .On the positive side, it highlighted the ethnic diversity of the United States and I view this as a positive thing. On the negative side, I think of how easy it is to live in Japan. Everything works! I was just in New York City and I had to go to five pay phones to find one that worked.

A professor of English writes gracefully about the impact on his own identity:

> Most basically, the Japanese experience, like the two-year French and two-year Chinese experiences I have also had, by contrast, taught me what is really American rather than the usual consumerist materialism that is most often thought of as America. It, with other experiences, reminded me forcefully that the real America—and the real me if I am a real American—is the willingness to abandon very importantly prior racial and national identity in order to become a willing and conscious participant in the great American experiment and experience, which is the dreamy ideal of creating a totally new breed of people truly dedicated to the rationalist, political experiment of a nation of people enjoying the equal protection of a government of laws rather than men. Of course, we have never arrived there. . . .

The disruptions in national identities can lead to several outcomes. One is the incorporation of some aspects of host country values with the basic home-country identity as core. A second is a clarification of the national identity and a stronger commitment to it without incorporation of host-country values or behaviors. A third outcome is a transcendence to a supranational identity that incorporates universal values. A fourth possibility is the rejection of the home-country identity to identify with the host country. Most of the Fulbright-

ers arrived back at a renewed synthesis of their original identifications as Japanese or American, with different degrees of incorporation of host-country values. Strikingly, many of the Japanese Fulbrighters in their more detailed recollections report that friends commented on their "American behavior," even though they were not conscious of so acting. No doubt, the more clearly delineated social patterns of Japan made it easier for even slight deviations to be noticed. Such comments were not made by American Fulbrighters.

We explored the extent to which identity was disrupted and the extent to which Japanese and American Fulbrighters incorporated host-country values into their life-styles.

One of the questions about the impact of the Fulbright experience asked: "All in all, as you look back, to what extent would you say that you have been influenced in your views about your identity as a Japanese (or American)?" Each Fulbrighter was asked to endorse one of four ordered degrees of influence: a lot, some, little bit, not at all." This followed questions that asked about the extent of influence on relations with spouse, children, and parents. The influence of the sojourn experience on views of their identity as a Japanese or an American was more significant than influences on their relations with spouses, children, or parents. Almost half (49.6%) of the Japanese Fulbrighters said that the experiences in the United States influenced their views a lot about their identity as Japanese and almost 4 out of 10 Americans (37.6%) reported a similar influence from their experience in Japan. If we include those who endorsed "some," the percentages of those whose national identities were influenced a lot or some is 86.4% among the Japanese and 69.3% among the Americans. The percentage of those who reported that they were influenced not at all is 5.4% among the Japanese and 12.5% among the American Fulbrighters.

There were differences by decade cohorts. Among the Japanese Fulbrighters, the cohort of the 1950s was influenced the most; 52.6% checked "a lot." There was a decrease in proportion of the next two cohorts who checked "a lot:" 45.7% of the 1960s cohort and 26.7% of the 1970s cohort. The youngest cohort, the 1980s, report an increase to 48.6% who say that they were influenced a lot with respect to their Japanese identity. Among the Americans, there was also a dip, when 20.9% of the cohort of 1960s reported they were influenced a lot in their views about their identity as an American. This significant influence on their views about their identity was reported by 38.2% of the 1950s cohort, reached a low point in the 1960s cohort, and increased to 36.2% in the 1970s cohort and to 46.6% in the 1980s cohort. These data suggest that the degree of influence on national identity is related to the na-

ture of the bilateral relationship prevailing at the time of sojourn abroad. The Japanese in the earlier cohorts who reported the most influence on their views about national identity went to the United States when Japan was very dependent on the United States. Americans in the later cohorts who reported the most influence on their views about national identity went to Japan when the Japanese had already become an economic power much stronger relative to the United States than 40 years earlier.

There were no statistically significant differences by sex regarding the influence on national identity among the Japanese Fulbrighters. However, there were somewhat more Japanese women (89.6%) than men (85.9%) who reported their national identities were influenced a lot or some. Among the Americans, there is a significant difference; almost twice as many women (58.2%) as men (33.0%) reported that their views of identity as Americans were influenced a lot. If we include those who reported the influence on their identities as "some," the percentages among the Americans increased to 89.1% for the women and 65.6% for the men. No doubt the differing roles of men and women in Japan and the United States must have been important contrast experiences for all of the Fulbrighters, particularly for the women.

Incorporation of Host-Country Values

An important issue is the extent to which the sojourn experience had lasting effects in terms of the incorporation of host-country values into the present life-styles of the Fulbrighters. It would have been quite complicated to ask about specific values. Several of the Fulbrighters who made detailed comments were able to organize such a configuration. For example, among the Japanese Fulbrighters, a professor of systems engineering states:

> My life-style embodies—to a great extent—American values: a greater emphasis on the personal values than on the group values; respect for one's creativity rather than the conformation to the conventional way of thinking; aggressiveness for the realization of personal values; detestation of any kind of control by the government and the like; respect for the spouse; and respect for and assimilation with people in the community.
>
> It is difficult for me to think in terms of American or Japanese values. What I value are, in the order of importance: (1) the respect for human dignity, (2) tolerance for diversity, (3) individual freedom, and (4) the appreciation of humor and beautiful things such as music or fine arts (professor of economics).

And among the Americans:

> We still admire Japanese aesthetic taste, and our home is, I think,

> a beautiful mixture of early American and traditional Chinese and Japanese touches. I am personally put off by what I feel to be excessive aspects of both cultures: on the American side, by too aggressive forms of assertiveness, or too blunt forms of directness; and on the Japanese side by a sometimes-maddening indirectness. I cannot honestly say there is any organization or rational hierarchy or even cultural identity in these values (emeritus professor of Chinese).

> To speak concretely may seem to talk about superficialities. My family and I do not have a Japanese house, but people sometimes say that it resembles one in some ways. We have several dozen well-used chopsticks that are as comfortable for us as knives and forks. . . . I can't say that I have ever tried to take on the behavior characteristics of the Japanese. They are theirs, not mine. I can admire them; I can't take them on. I suppose in some way those qualities have insinuated themselves into my consciousness but I can't be specific about it . . . (professor of English).

The quotations provide an insight into the complexity of understanding the process of incorporation of host-country values into the home-country set. Our research strategy was to explore this outcome generally rather than specifically. We asked the respondents to circle the point on a scale ranging from one (the extreme home-country's values position) through five (the halfway position) to nine (the most extreme host-country's value position) with respect to how much they had incorporated the host country values in their present "style of life."

One end position on the scale can be viewed as indicating no influence from their sojourns abroad (or from exposure to books, movies, TV, other trips abroad, etc.); the "all Japanese" position was chosen by 0.7% of Japanese Fulbrighters and the "all American" position was chosen by 4.1% of American Fulbrighters. The other end position of the scale can be viewed as indicating total acceptance of host country values; the "all American" position was chosen by 0.7% of the Japanese and the "all Japanese" position was chosen by 1.3% of the Americans. Overall, the Japanese were more apt to incorporate American values into their life-styles than were Americans to incorporate Japanese values. For example, 37.2% of the Japanese Fulbrighters stated that their values were more than 50% American, whereas only 17% of Americans responded that their life-style values were more than 50% Japanese. Only 31.6% of Japanese stated that their life-style values were mostly Japanese, whereas 63.1% of Americans stated that their life style values were mostly American. It seems clear that the Japanese were more influenced by their sojourn in America than were the Americans by their sojourn in Japan. These differences were not affected by gender, field of specialization, decade of sojourn, or sex.

Individual Differences in Identity and Life-Style

The sojourn experience had a greater impact on the view of national identity and greater incorporation of host-country life-style patterns for Japanese Fulbrighters than for American Fulbrighters. Although the group outcomes were different, there were individual differences among the Japanese Fulbrighters as well as the American Fulbrighters. An interesting question concerns whether there were characteristics that were related to differences in individual outcomes in identity disruption and present life-style configuration in each group of Fulbrighters. That is, what characteristics of American and Japanese Fulbrighters would be more likely to result in the sojourn experience having greater influence on their views about national identity and their incorporation of Japanese (or American values) in their present life-styles.

Most research suggests that those who were younger at the time of a significant psychological experience would be affected more than those who were older; the Fulbright experience abroad is one of those significant experiences. A longer period of time abroad would increase the impact. We found that the Japanese Fulbrighters who went earlier to the United States were more affected than those who went later. The Americans who went to Japan later were more affected than those who went earlier. We expected that women would be more affected than men by their Fulbright experiences. Specialists in humanities and social sciences might be expected to be more sympathetic to cultural differences than other specialists. Those Fulbrighters who were more likely to observe the host-country social patterns, to evaluate positively these social patterns, and to be positively influenced by the Fulbright experiences, could be expected to be more affected and sympathetic to the host-country life-styles.

In sum, we expected these factors to be related to differences in both the extent to which the individual Fulbrighters reported that their national identity was disrupted and that host-country values were incorporated into in their present life-styles. Regression analysis was undertaken to explore these relationships. (The details of the regression analysis are in Appendix II.) The results demonstrated that these factors were related to differences in the two outcomes of identity disruption and life-style integration. These factors explained more of the differences among the American Fulbrighters than among the Japanese Fulbrighters. This result supports previous findings that the sojourn experience was more similar for the Japanese than for the American Fulbrighters. Nonetheless, differences on these factors were also related to differences in outcomes for the Japanese Fulbrighters. (For further details, see Appendix I.)

III. Views About Japan and the United States

Introduction

The reciprocal relations between two societies occur on many levels. (Isaacs, 1958; Buchanan and Cantril, 1953; and Watts, Packard, Clough and Oxnam, 1979, pp. 31–5).

In a book entitled *Mutual Images* (Iriye, A., ed., 1975), Japanese and American authors explore the ways in which the United States and Americans have been depicted in Japan and the ways in which Japan and the Japanese have been depicted in the United States by the elite, by travelers, by scholars, by specialized groups, in fairs, media, and in public opinion polls, ranging from the first contacts between the two societies through the difficulties of the World War II period, to the present. In a thoughtful introduction, Iriye raises questions about the appropriate ways in which to study images, noting ". . . difficulties in establishing meaningful connections between separate individuals' images," and how these separate images might be reconciled. He suggests that "Images may have a life and history of their own, quite independent of the image holders," and discusses the role of government policy in establishing images and the relationship of images to the social system (p. 16). He observes that the essays permit no simple generalization about the "exceptionalist" tendency in American self-perceptions or the similar "particular ist" tendency in Japanese self-perceptions. Nor that "any other commonly suggested themes such as moralism, sentimentalism, or selfishness, is a monopoly of Japanese or Americans. Both peoples share these traits. The question, then, becomes one of devising a methodological framework in which

both Japanese images of the United States and American images of Japan can be analyzed and compared," (p. 160).

We do not provide such a comprehensive framework for the analysis of societal images. Our effort is more modest, but comparative in objective and about a clearly delineated population—Japanese and American Fulbrighters who spent two years or more, on average, in the other country in pursuit of educational objectives. The views of Japanese and American Fulbrighters are compared with respect to a number of current issues about Japan and the United States.

The end of World War II ushered in a series of intertwined interactions between the United States and Japan. Clearly, the activity having profound consequences was the occupation of Japan by the United States military and the acceptance of the 1947 Constitution (Watanuki, 1977, pp. 17–19). Slowly, at the beginning of this period, the Japanese economy recovered, thanks to the Dodge mission and the filling of material needs for the allied forces during the Korean war (Iriye and Cohen, 1989, and Verba et al., 1987, pp. 21–29).

The acceptance of quality products in optics, such as cameras, and electronics (transistor radios, TVs, VCRs) was followed by the production of automobiles and vital parts for computers, such as flat screens and CPUs, that increasingly led to complaints of unfair competition from American manufacturers. The trip by President Bush to Japan in January 1992 with the chief executive officers of the "big three" automobile companies in the United States symbolized the change in the economic relationship between the two countries over the last half century. At the same time, there have been major internal changes in the two countries. In the United States, the impact of the Vietnam War, the black civil rights and women's movements, the increasing loss of manufacturing jobs, and the problems of the inner cities, where there is increasing poverty, drug violence, and intergroup conflict, to name a few. The changes in Japan seem less dramatic, but just as consequential: the slow changes toward individualism occasioned by equal rights provisions in the constitution, the increasing representation of women in mainstream occupations, the problems associated with fingerprinting for foreigners (recently changed), the ambivalence about providing military units for United Nations actions, the leadership role of an economically powerful Japan, and the problems of leisure and aging, to name several (Verba et al., pp. 20–30; Pharr, 1981).

These historic shifts provide the materials for an exploration of the present attitudes of Japanese and American Fulbrighters. The relationship between

the two countries has been a solid one politically and militarily, but not without its difficulties.

In 1978, a poll of adult Americans found that:

> The citizens of the United States appear quite knowledgeable about Japan and generally hold Japan and the Japanese people in high regard. Many of the negative stereotypes prevalent in the era of World War II have given way to a markedly positive image of Japan.
>
> Most Americans support maintaining U.S. troops in Japan at current levels or higher. Further, at least one American in two favors coming to the defense of Japan with U.S. military might, should Japan be attacked by either the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China.
>
> Americans look on Japan as a reliable friend, and rank it near the top of the list as a nation important to U.S. global interests.
>
> Only concern in the minds of many Americans about the trade imbalance and its perceived effects on unemployment in the United States clouds the picture (Watts, et al., 1979, p. 31).

The views of the Fulbrighters may be different in some respects from a random sample of adults in Japan and the United States. The Fulbrighters are part of the informed and educated group in their own countries and their views are significant in the structure of public opinion and particularly with respect to Japan–U.S. issues. We know that the social location of persons is an important influence on behavior and attitudes. The attitudes of educated persons in higher-status occupations are different in distinctive ways from those with lesser education or in lower-status occupations (Devine, 1970; Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1960). Whether the views of Fulbrighters are more influential than those of other similarly situated persons in shaping the views of the other country or on policy formulations by their government depends upon the circumstances. More to the point, all of the Fulbrighters have spent a significant period of time studying, teaching, or doing research in Japan or the United States. Thus, these are individuals who have some experiential basis for their attitudes. We expect that this overseas experience will influence their attitudes about Japan and the United States. In order to explore the role of their sojourn experience on their attitudes, we compare them to "colleagues" without similar experience in Japan or the United States.

Survey of Fulbright Colleagues

Each of the Fulbrighters was asked to pass along to a colleague a copy of

the same opinion questionnaire and a letter signed by the study's sponsors with a short description of the study's purpose that requested the colleague's participation. A short face sheet asked the colleague for basic information: sex, highest achieved education, present occupation, and length, purpose, and place of overseas experience, if any. Those Americans who had any educational or work experience longer than half a year in Japan (or, for Japanese respondents, any extended experience in the United States) were excluded from the analysis. As expected, the proportions of colleagues who returned questionnaires was much smaller than the Fulbrighters; 31.4% (361) of colleagues compared to 68.7% of Japanese Fulbrighters, 20.8% (142) of colleagues compared to 49.5% of American Fulbrighters. The ratio of colleagues who returned questionnaires to Fulbrighters who returned questionnaires was similar for both countries; 45.7% among the Japanese and 41.5% among the Americans. The lesser return by colleagues is not surprising since there was less motivation for them to participate in this study than there was for Fulbrighters.

The colleagues who returned questionnaires in Japan and the United States were quite similar in socioeconomic characteristics, as we had expected. Among both national groups, there were slightly more females among the colleagues than among the Fulbrighters (15.6% and 11.1% among the Japanese and 23.2% and 17.3% among the Americans). Both sets of Fulbrighters were more likely than their colleagues to have attended elite institutions in their own countries for their highest degrees (67.2% and 51.4% among the Japanese and 66.7% and 47.2% among the Americans). A greater proportion of Fulbrighters than colleagues in both countries held doctoral degrees (37.3% and 20.8% among the Japanese and 75.7% and 63.6% among the Americans). The largest distribution of specialty areas for Fulbrighters and colleagues was in social sciences and humanities (65.3% and 63.1% among the Japanese and 74.9% and 71% among the Americans). There was a larger percentage of Japanese Fulbrighters who were employed in managerial or proprietor positions (40.8%) compared to their colleagues (31.8%). Among the Americans, both groups were predominantly employed as professionals (98.5% for Fulbrighters and 92.9% for colleagues.) In short, the colleagues are very similar to the Fulbrighters except that the former are more likely to be female and less likely to have attended the elite institutions in their home country for the bachelor's degree (Japan) or highest degree (United States). The colleagues, in sum, provide a comparison group that is quite similar in education, area of specialty, employment context, and gender to the Fulbrighters. Thus, differences that emerge between the Fulbrighters and colleagues with respect to present views about Japan and the

United States can be attributed to other factors on which they differ. One of those factors is an extended period of time in the United States for Japanese Fulbrighters and in Japan for American Fulbrighters.

The assessment of opinions about two societies that have been intermeshed in complex ways in the half century since World War II is very difficult. There are bound to be sentiments of home-country pride or regard that come into play in their responses even at the present time.

Some lingering differences in the perspectives and present views of adult Japanese and Americans were found in other surveys conducted in Japan and in the United States in 1991, 50 years after the outbreak of war between the two countries (*New York Times*, December 8, 1991). More Americans (77%) than Japanese (65%) stated that their feelings toward the other country are generally friendly. More Japanese (55%) than Americans (40%) stated that the Japanese government should formally apologize to the United States for its attack on Pearl Harbor. More Japanese (73%) than Americans (16%) stated that the United States government should formally apologize to Japan and its people for dropping the atomic bombs.

Such country-anchored views may be less important regarding the consequences of widely known historical events such as the reforms of the American occupation of Japan. The influence of home-country anchored views may be more evident regarding statements as whether anti-Japan or anti-American bashing are the results of economic factors or arrogance and prejudice. We would expect that the Fulbrighters and their colleagues would be more likely to consider the objective or more complex perspectives in evaluating the issues than would be the case of the average person in each society. Nonetheless, the Fulbrighters and their colleagues have been socialized in Japan or the United States and we would expect them to be sensitive to and assert their country's perspectives in the responses. Because of the difficulty—perhaps impossibility—of separating the objective or "cognitively rational" part from the home-country-regarding part, the statements are not ordered on this dimension.

There are few systematic comparative studies of the views of Americans about Japan and of Japanese about the United States. A study by Pierce and colleagues (Pierce, Lovrich, Tsurutani and Abe, 1987) found differences between elites in Japan (Shizuoka prefecture) and in the United States (Spokane area) and between the elites and the general public in both Japan and the United States with regard to environmental belief systems. A comparative study of elites in Sweden, the United States, and Japan (Verba et al., 1987, pp. 77–92)

regarding issues about equality found differences among the countries even though in each country the left and labor groups were on the progressive side and business and conservative groups opposed them. For example, the elite of American labor was opposed to radical redistribution of income, the Swedish business elite supported the welfare state, and in Japan, labor and business were closer to each other on this issue than in the other two countries (p. 84).

Thus we expect some differences among the Fulbrighters from Japan and the United States with respect to the opinion statements. Given home-country loyalty, we would expect Japanese Fulbrighters to agree more with points of view favorable to Japan and American Fulbrighters to agree more with points of view favorable to the United States.

The colleagues, being from the same country and in the same socioeconomic statuses as Fulbrighters, should have opinions similar to those of the Fulbrighters. We would expect, however, that they may be less likely to choose the extreme categories of agreement—strongly agree or strongly disagree—and more likely to choose the middle categories—agree and disagree. It might also be argued that they would be more likely to take a country pride point of view than the Fulbrighters and they would disagree more (total of strongly disagree and disagree) with statements unfavorable to their home country.

Table 6 details the responses of Fulbrighters (Japanese and American) to a series of questions about Japan and the United States. Table 7 presents the questionnaire responses of colleagues of these Fulbrighters. The following section summarizes the responses and compares the Fulbrighters' and colleagues' differing replies.

Table 6

Opinions About Japan and the United States Held by Fulbrighters

We are interested in knowing your personal views on some issues about Japan and the United States. Please read the following statements. Then indicate the extent of your agreement or disagreement with the statement by *circling* the appropriate number on the scale to the right of each statement. There are no right or wrong answers.

Percentages (%) of responses are listed by rows, first for Japanese Fulbrighters (top), and then for American Fulbrighters (bottom).

OPINIONS ABOUT JAPAN HELD BY FULBRIGHTERS

	Strongly Agree (%)	Agree Some (%)	Disagree Some (%)	Strongly Disagree (%)	Missing N/A
1. The reforms initiated by the United States occupation of Japan after World War II were significant in:					
a) providing equal rights for women	50.1 22.6	45.9 55.7	3.2 12.9	0.8 8.8	30 24
b) changing family relationships toward greater equality	26.8 13.6	62.9 63.0	9.2 17.4	1.2 6.0	34 26
c) introducing appreciation for individual rights	44.3 13.9	49.1 70.6	5.8 12.9	0.8 2.6	25 32
d) reforming absentee ownership of rural land	55.3 53.4	34.5 37.1	8.2 8.7	2.0 0.8	41 78
2. The office of the Emperor is essential in providing a national symbol for Japan	25.7 18.2	37.3 43.4	25.3 28.9	11.6 9.5	30 17
3. In Japan, social and personal connections are more important than individual merit in getting the best jobs	9.9 24.9	45.3 50.8	38.4 20.5	6.4 3.8	22 25
4. The homogeneity of the Japanese people is an important factor in Japan's amazing recovery from the devastation of World War II.	34.8 41.7	51.0 39.5	11.0 13.6	3.1 5.2	26 18
5. Individual rights are often subordinated to the public good in Japan	13.0 44.1	56.2 46.9	26.9 8.0	3.9 0.9	26 18
6. The current generation of young Japanese adults do not work as hard as their parents did	25.8 17.0	49.9 62.7	22.3 17.3	2.1 3.0	24 42
7. Japanese women should be given the same rights and opportunities for self-development in all areas of life as Japanese men	55.2 75.4	39.9 23.7	4.1 0.9	0.9 0.0	23 21

Opinions About Japan Held by Fulbrighters (cont.)*

	Strongly Agree (%)	Agree Some (%)	Disagree Some (%)	Strongly Disagree (%)	Missing N/A
8. Japanese women will continue to give priority to the role of housewife and mother even as they move toward occupational parity with men	18.7 28.8	70.2 54.2	10.8 15.1	0.3 1.9	29 30
9. As foreign residents increase in number, Japanese society will lose its consensus on core values	7.0 3.8	46.8 32.3	41.5 43.1	4.7 20.8	27 29
10. Scientific creativity will require the Japanese to become more individualistic and less group oriented	20.7 10.1	50.2 39.7	27.2 39.1	1.8 11.1	31 35
11. University education in Japan needs to be reformed extensively to bring it up to world-class standards	57.8 25.5	31.3 41.0	8.8 24.8	2.1 8.7	25 32
12. Japan should not expect to be as close as European countries are to the United States because of different history of relationships	13.9 5.4	43.5 39.5	34.6 37.9	8.0 17.2	25 28
13. Change in Japan comes largely in response to external pressures—such as from the United States, for example	36.6 11.4	56.3 51.1	6.7 29.5	.4 7.9	24 27
14. Japan must take a greater role in world affairs commensurate with its economic strength	55.0 43.6	41.0 46.7	3.4 7.8	.5 1.9	23 21
OPINIONS ABOUT THE UNITED STATES HELD BY FULBRIGHTERS					
15. The Japanese self-defense forces will have to share responsibility with the U.S. military in East Asia	10.1 17.4	20.5 40.1	39.3 28.1	30.0 14.5	28 25

	Strongly Agree (%)	Agree Some (%)	Disagree Some (%)	Strongly Disagree (%)	Missing N/A
16. Anger and suspicion because of World War II are important factors in present day American attitudes	5.8	37.2	47.1	9.9	28
toward Japan	11.7	50.0	26.5	11.7	18
17. In general, Americans still tend to be more concerned with events	46.1	47.0	6.4	0.4	27
in Europe than in Asia	31.7	50.6	15.2	2.4	14
18. The public good is often subordinated to individual	18.8	58.9	21.1	1.2	29
rights in the United States.	20.6	45.8	24.9	8.6	17
19. American individualism needs to be tempered with more emphasis upon the welfare of groups and cooperation among	14.7	53.1	29.4	2.8	34
individuals	40.7	45.1	13.0	1.2	18
20. The large number of ethnic groups in the United States makes it difficult to achieve consensus on long-term	8.9	48.9	36.7	5.6	35
goals	19.8	42.1	26.6	11.5	19
21. Conflict, disorder, and unruliness in American life are necessary prices to pay for freedom and	17.2	50.7	28.6	3.6	36
individuality	6.3	38.2	36.4	19.1	23
22. The current generation of young American adults do not work as hard as their	12.4	45.2	38.6	3.9	44
parents	19.4	43.6	32.0	5.0	23
23. American education needs to be more rigorous at the elementary and high school levels in science and	27.8	52.0	19.1	1.1	40
and mathematics	72.0	25.3	2.1	0.6	14

*Percentages (%) of responses are listed by rows, first for Japanese Fulbrighters (top), and then for American Fulbrighters (bottom).

Opinions About the United States Held by Fulbrighters (cont.)*

	Strongly Agree (%)	Agree Some (%)	Disagree Some (%)	Strongly Disagree (%)	Missing N/A
24. The close cooperation of government and industry in Japan is a model that the United States can emulate to regain its	8.0	35.0	47.4	9.6	39
industrial edge	14.0	47.1	28.7	10.2	28
25. American industry should invest more in research	17.9	44.8	35.1	2.3	38
and development	63.2	33.4	3.1	0.3	16
26. American business needs to take the long view, as Japanese business does, rather than be driven by	29.8	48.1	19.4	2.7	37
short-term profits	71.9	25.0	0.9	2.2	22
27. Lifetime employment for American workers, as in Japan, would increase productivity in the United	6.6	43.7	44.5	5.2	42
States	6.8	46.3	38.8	8.1	33
28. A major factor in the present imbalance of trade between the United States and Japan is American consumerism—as manifested in the large federal deficit and the low savings rate of Americans rather than market barriers	27.6	54.5	16.3	1.6	39
in Japan	23.8	42.2	22.2	11.7	27
29. The increasing investment in the United States by the Japanese is a matter	20.9	60.1	18.3	0.7	38
of concern to Americans	19.3	54.7	16.8	9.3	20
30. The United States will continue to be the leading economic power in the	27.1	58.9	12.6	1.4	27
21st century	12.9	47.9	32.8	6.4	31

	Strongly Agree (%)	Agree Some (%)	Disagree Some (%)	Strongly Disagree (%)	Missing N/A
NET ASSESSMENT OF JAPAN–US RELATIONS					
31. "Japan Bashing" in the United States stems mainly from prejudice and racism, rather than from economic factors	11.6	48.2	35.4	4.7	23
	11.8	29.4	40.6	18.3	19
32. "American Bashing" in Japan stems mainly from growing nationalism and arrogance rather than from economic factors	9.9	40.0	42.4	7.8	28
	11.3	46.8	36.1	5.8	32
33. Competition and conflict in Japan–U.S. relations may become more intense	18.3	59.6	21.4	0.7	25
	24.5	67.7	7.8	0.0	20
34. On the whole, the net impact of United States' influence on Japan since 1945 has been beneficial	54.4	43.4	1.8	0.4	18
	48.3	48.6	3.1	0.0	19
35. On the whole, the net impact of Japanese influence on the United States since 1945 has been beneficial	11.5	63.5	22.8	2.2	32
	30.7	59.8	9.2	0.3	16

Finally, we are interested in how you assess Japan and the United States on the following dimensions: (Please *circle* one level for each country.)

	Very High (%)	High (%)	Low (%)	Very Low (%)	Missing N/A
36. Level of scientific achievement:	18.4	67.2	13.1	1.3	26
a. Japan	29.6	63.3	6.8	0.3	18
	68.0	30.7	1.2	0.1	25
b. United States	72.9	25.8	1.2	0.0	17
37. Level of technological achievement:	63.1	35.0	1.5	0.4	31
a. Japan	82.1	17.9	0.0	0.0	13
	34.8	56.4	8.5	0.3	33
b. United States	44.5	52.4	2.7	0.3	14

*Percentages (%) of responses are listed by rows, first for Japanese Fulbrighters (top), and then for American Fulbrighters (bottom).

Net Assessment of Japan-U.S. Relations (cont.)*

	Very High (%)	High (%)	Low (%)	Very Low (%)	Missing N/A
38. Level of social science research and humanistic scholarship:	3.2	46.3	44.9	5.5	49
a. Japan	4.9	49.3	40.5	5.3	38
	30.5	61.0	8.1	0.4	50
b. United States	49.5	46.0	4.5	0.0	29
39. Level of artistic achievement:	7.3	56.2	32.4	4.1	51
a. Japan	48.8	43.2	6.5	1.6	20
	15.0	64.3	20.0	0.7	54
b. United States	31.5	54.9	13.0	0.6	18
40. Level of economic achievement:	61.5	36.7	1.5	0.4	30
a. Japan	81.9	17.5	0.6	0.0	22
	13.9	61.5	23.5	1.1	35
b. United States	35.3	53.6	10.4	0.6	25
41. Standard of living:	6.6	57.0	33.2	3.2	27
a. Japan	24.7	63.6	11.1	0.6	18
	42.1	54.5	3.1	0.3	26
b. United States	50.3	46.9	2.2	0.6	20
42. Quality of life:	1.3	32.2	55.1	11.2	30
a. Japan	17.3	62.0	19.5	1.3	29
	35.8	58.9	4.3	0.9	28
b. United States	28.8	62.7	8.2	0.3	26
43. Quality of political leadership:	0.7	8.7	54.9	35.8	28
a. Japan	1.3	31.2	53.7	13.8	31
	31.0	55.6	12.2	1.2	33
b. United States	2.5	26.2	56.5	14.8	25
44. Quality of family life:	3.0	48.5	43.7	4.8	31
a. Japan	14.6	58.8	25.3	1.3	34
	11.2	60.4	26.3	2.1	35
b. United States	5.2	43.4	48.5	2.9	33
45. Quality of environment:	1.7	26.9	56.0	15.4	26
a. Japan	2.3	35.0	57.2	5.5	31
	17.8	65.8	15.3	1.1	30
b. United States	4.9	54.2	40.6	0.3	34

*Percentages (%) of responses are listed by rows, first for Japanese Fulbrighters (top), and then for American Fulbrighters (bottom).

Table 7
Opinions About Japan and the United States Held by Fulbrighters' Colleagues

We are interested in knowing your personal views on some issues about Japan and the United States. Please read the following statements. Then indicate the extent of your agreement or disagreement with the statement by *circling* the appropriate number on the scale to the right of each statement. There are no right or wrong answers.

Percentages (%) of responses are listed by rows, first for Japanese colleagues (top), and then for American colleagues (bottom).

OPINIONS ABOUT JAPAN HELD BY FULBRIGHTERS' COLLEAGUES

	Strongly Agree (%)	Agree Some (%)	Disagree Some (%)	Strongly Disagree (%)	Missing N/A
1. The reforms initiated by the United States occupation of Japan after World War II were significant in:					
a) providing equal rights for women	32.9	61.3	5.0	0.8	2
	9.7	44.8	25.4	20.1	8
b) changing family relationships toward greater equality	18.0	65.2	15.2	1.7	5
	3.0	41.4	42.1	13.5	9
c) introducing appreciation for individual rights	34.0	56.8	8.6	0.6	2
	7.6	61.1	24.4	6.9	11
d) reforming absentee ownership of rural land	48.1	37.6	11.7	2.6	10
	10.8	45.0	35.1	9.0	31
2. The office of the Emperor is essential in providing a national symbol for Japan	23.1	37.9	25.9	13.1	2
	20.7	47.4	20.7	11.1	7
3. In Japan, social and personal connections are more important than individual merit in getting the best jobs	6.9	43.8	44.3	5.0	0
	19.7	48.9	25.5	5.8	5
4. The homogeneity of the Japanese people is an important factor in Japan's amazing recovery from the devastation of World War II.	37.2	48.9	11.2	2.8	3
	54.4	30.1	11.8	3.7	6

Opinions About Japan Held by Fulbrighters' Colleagues (cont.)*

	Strongly Agree (%)	Agree Some (%)	Disagree Some (%)	Strongly Disagree (%)	Missing N/A
5. Individual rights are often subordinated to the public good in Japan	12.8	53.9	31.3	2.2	1
	38.4	52.9	7.2	1.4	4
6. The current generation of young Japanese adults do not work as hard as their parents did	22.0	47.4	28.1	2.5	2
	9.1	44.7	35.6	10.6	10
7. Japanese women should be given the same rights and opportunities for self-development in all areas of life as Japanese men	54.5	39.7	5.6	0.3	3
	80.7	17.9	1.4	0.0	2
8. Japanese women will continue to give priority to the role of housewife and mother even as they move toward occupational parity with men	15.7	65.3	18.2	0.8	4
	11.2	59.0	26.1	3.7	8
9. As foreign residents increase in number, Japanese society will lose its consensus on core values	6.1	38.8	50.0	5.0	3
	3.0	48.1	34.8	14.1	7
10. Scientific creativity will require the Japanese to become more individualistic and less group oriented	17.2	39.5	38.1	5.1	7
	8.1	36.3	45.2	10.4	7
11. University education in Japan needs to be reformed extensively to bring it up to world-class standards	47.8	34.7	15.0	2.5	1
	5.4	45.0	31.0	18.6	13
12. Japan should not expect to be as close as European countries are to the United States because of different history of relationships	16.2	43.4	31.4	9.0	4
	11.2	36.6	38.8	13.4	8

	Strongly Agree (%)	Agree Some (%)	Disagree Some (%)	Strongly Disagree (%)	Missing N/A
13. Change in Japan comes largely in response to external pressures—such as from the United States, for example	39.8	50.7	8.6	0.8	2
	19.3	43.0	33.3	4.4	7
14. Japan must take a greater role in world affairs commensurate with its economic strength	50.1	42.4	6.1	1.4	5
	43.4	44.9	9.6	2.2	6
OPINIONS ABOUT THE UNITED STATES HELD BY FULBRIGHTERS' COLLEAGUES					
15. The Japanese self-defense forces will have to share responsibility with the U.S. military in East Asia	5.3	14.7	43.6	36.4	1
	25.9	51.1	15.6	7.4	7
16. Anger and suspicion because of World War II are important factors in present day American attitudes toward Japan	5.0	35.4	49.0	10.6	2
	17.3	39.6	25.9	17.3	3
17. In general, Americans still tend to be more concerned with events in Europe than in Asia	45.4	43.5	10.1	1.1	4
	34.0	50.4	12.1	3.5	1
18. The public good is often subordinated to individual rights in the United States	19.9	52.1	26.9	1.1	4
	13.6	42.1	25.7	18.6	2
19. American individualism needs to be tempered with more emphasis upon the welfare of groups and cooperation among individuals	11.9	49.4	35.0	3.7	7
	28.4	51.8	12.1	7.8	1
20. The large number of ethnic groups in the United States makes it difficult to achieve consensus on long-term goals	8.5	42.3	41.7	7.6	6
	17.3	43.2	24.5	15.1	3

*Percentages (%) of responses are listed by rows, first for Japanese colleagues (top), and then for American colleagues (bottom).

Opinions About the United States Held by Fulbrighters' Colleagues (cont.)*

	Strongly Agree (%)	Agree Some (%)	Disagree Some (%)	Strongly Disagree (%)	Missing N/A
21. Conflict, disorder, and unruliness in American life are necessary prices to pay for freedom and individuality	14.9	47.0	31.5	6.5	6
	8.7	34.1	29.0	28.3	4
22. The current generation of young American adults do not work as hard as their parents	10.3	41.3	46.4	2.0	10
	20.1	52.5	24.5	2.9	3
23. American education needs to be more rigorous at the elementary and high school levels in sciences and mathematics	14.4	47.3	36.3	2.0	8
	69.1	26.6	3.6	0.7	3
24. The close cooperation of government and industry in Japan is a model that the United States can emulate to regain its industrial edge	5.3	33.3	53.5	7.8	4
	10.4	41.8	38.8	9.0	8
25. American industry should invest more in research and development	12.9	33.1	48.6	5.3	5
	56.2	39.4	4.4	0.0	5
26. American business needs to take the long view, as Japanese business does, rather than be driven by short-term profits	27.0	38.6	29.3	5.1	6
	69.6	26.8	2.9	0.7	4
27. Lifetime employment for American workers, as in Japan, would increase productivity in the United States	7.0	38.3	48.3	5.9	5
	9.6	38.2	39.0	13.2	6
28. A major factor in the present imbalance of trade between the United States and Japan is American conumerism—as manifested in the large federal deficit and the low savings rate of Americans rather than market barriers in Japan	24.6	51.3	21.6	2.5	4
	15.0	39.8	32.3	12.8	9

	Strongly Agree (%)	Agree Some (%)	Disagree Some (%)	Strongly Disagree (%)	Missing N/A
29. The increasing investment in the United States by the Japanese is a matter of	20.3	62.4	16.2	1.1	2
concern to Americans	35.8	52.6	10.9	0.7	5
30. The United States will continue to be the leading economic power in the	22.9	52.5	20.9	3.6	3
21st century	10.4	48.9	35.6	5.2	7
NET ASSESSMENT OF JAPAN–US RELATIONS					
31. "Japan Bashing" in the United States stems mainly from prejudice and racism, rather rather than from	15.6	39.4	41.4	3.7	8
economic factors	7.9	24.3	47.9	20.0	2
32. "American Bashing" in Japan stems mainly from growing nationalism and arrogance rather than from	9.5	37.9	43.7	8.9	13
economic factors	8.6	53.1	33.6	4.7	14
33. Competition and conflict in Japan–U.S. relations may	17.6	60.1	21.8	0.6	8
become more intense	38.3	56.7	5.0	0.0	3
34. On the whole, the net impact of United States' influence on Japan since	35.8	58.6	4.5	1.1	6
1945 has been beneficial	39.4	54.0	6.6	0.0	5
35. On the whole, the net impact of Japanese influence on the United States since	8.6	62.6	26.3	2.6	11
1945 has been beneficial	23.5	58.1	16.9	1.5	6

Finally, we are interested in how you assess Japan and the United States on the following dimensions: (Please *circle* one level for each country.)

	Very High (%)	High (%)	Low (%)	Very Low (%)	Missing N/A
36. Level of scientific achievement:	17.6	60.2	21.6	0.6	9
a. Japan	26.2	60.3	13.5	0.0	1
	65.5	33.9	0.6	0.0	7
b. United States	71.6	24.8	3.5	0.0	1

*Percentages (%) of responses are listed by rows, first for Japanese colleagues (top), and then for American colleagues (bottom).

Net Assessment of Japan-U.S. Relations (cont.)*

	Very High (%)	High (%)	Low (%)	Very Low (%)	Missing N/A
37. Level of technological achievement:	65.6	32.7	1.7	0.0	9
a. Japan	80.1	19.9	0.0	0.0	1
	28.5	62.4	9.1	0.0	10
b. United States	42.1	52.9	5.0	0.0	2
38. Level of social science research and humanistic scholarship:	1.4	42.8	50.0	5.8	15
a. Japan	0.8	31.1	63.1	4.9	20
	24.9	65.2	9.0	0.9	16
b. United States	33.6	53.0	13.4	0.0	8
39. Level of artistic achievement:	6.9	49.9	37.5	5.8	14
a. Japan	25.2	57.5	15.7	1.6	15
	13.7	59.0	25.6	1.7	17
b. United States	24.2	62.9	12.1	0.8	10
40. Level of economic achievement:	59.0	39.5	1.4	0.0	7
a. Japan	82.6	17.4	0.0	0.0	4
	10.6	64.9	23.1	1.4	11
b. United States	38.8	46.8	13.4	0.7	3
41. Standard of living:	3.7	59.2	33.7	3.4	8
a. Japan	21.9	67.9	8.8	1.5	5
	28.7	66.2	4.5	0.6	9
b. United States	43.2	54.7	2.2	0.0	3
42. Quality of life:	2.0	32.4	53.8	11.8	6
a. Japan	9.7	68.7	20.9	0.7	8
	24.4	65.7	9.3	0.6	8
b. United States	24.3	63.6	12.1	0.0	2
43. Quality of political leadership:	0.6	6.8	51.4	41.2	7
a. Japan	3.8	38.6	52.3	5.3	10
	33.9	51.6	12.3	2.3	10
b. United States	4.4	35.8	48.9	10.9	5
44. Quality of family life:	4.0	48.6	41.2	6.2	7
a. Japan	20.1	62.7	12.7	4.5	8
	7.1	61.9	28.1	2.8	9
b. United States	2.2	49.6	46.7	1.5	7

	Very High (%)	High (%)	Low (%)	Very Low (%)	Missing N/A
45. Quality of environment:	2.5	24.4	54.7	18.4	8
a. Japan	0.8	37.4	54.2	7.6	11
	8.5	62.2	27.0	2.3	9
b. United States	3.7	54.1	39.3	3.0	7

*Percentages (%) of responses are listed by rows, first for Japanese colleagues (top), and then for American colleagues (bottom).

Note: Percentages (%) are calculated based on valid percent.

Opinions about Japan

The questions about Japan focus on (a) the impact of the U.S. occupation on various reforms, (b) the significance of the emperor institution, (c) aspects of Japanese society, and (d) Japan and external relationships.

Occupation Reforms

As a result of the reforms initiated by the U.S. occupation of Japan, women were given equal rights, primogeniture was legally abolished, individual rights were protected, the age requiring parental consent for marriage was reduced to 20 years with mutual consent of the couple, land reforms gave ownership of land to tenant farmers, and the institution of the emperor was kept. We were interested in knowing to what extent there was agreement by the Japanese and Americans that the reforms initiated by the U.S. occupation were significant and that the role of the emperor was essential in providing a national symbol for Japan.

More than 9 of 10 Japanese Fulbrighters agreed that the reforms initiated by the U.S. occupation were significant in providing equal rights for women, changing family relationships toward equality, appreciation for individual rights, and reforming absentee ownership of rural land. The influence of the occupation was seen most strongly (those checking "strongly agree") in reforming absentee ownership of rural land and providing equal rights for women. The responses of the American Fulbrighters were more scattered. Considering just the agree/disagree responses, the American Fulbrighters viewed the impact of the U.S. occupation as most significant in the case of land reform (90.5%), followed by provisions for individual rights (84.5%), then equal rights for women (77.9%). A large proportion of American Fulbrighters disagreed (60%) that the occupation reforms were significant in changing family rela-

tionships in Japan toward greater equality. Although 89.7% of the Japanese Fulbrighters agreed about the significant role of the occupation-initiated reforms in facilitating family equality, the proportion of those who chose "strongly agree" was the smallest (26.8%) for the four statements. The Japanese Fulbrighters, however, were more likely to check "strongly agree" to each of these four statements than were the American Fulbrighters.

Perception of Emperor's Role

More than 6 out of 10 of both Japanese and American Fulbrighters agreed that the office of the Emperor is essential in providing a national symbol for Japan. Proportionately more Japanese Fulbrighters than American Fulbrighters checked both "strongly agree" (25.8% to 18.2%) and "disagree strongly" (11.6% to 9.5%), indicating greater intensity of feelings about the institution. The degree of endorsement by the Japanese Fulbrighters is somewhat below the level found in polls of the Japanese taken between 1955 and 1986. Sigeki and Thayer (1986, pp. 75–89) report percentages supporting a symbolic role for the Emperor of 60% in 1955, gradually rising to the 77% and 84% ranges in the 1970–1986 period.

Perception of Japanese Society

The next series of statements was about aspects of Japanese society. American Fulbrighters agreed more (75.7%) than did Japanese Fulbrighters (55.3%) that in Japan, social and personal connections, rather than merit, were important in getting the best jobs. American Fulbrighters were also more likely to agree strongly (24.9%) than were the Japanese Fulbrighters (9.9%) to that statement. A similar response pattern was evident regarding the statement that individual rights are often subordinated to the public good in Japan. More than nine out of 10 American Fulbrighters agreed (with 44.1% checking "strongly agree"), compared with 7 out of 10 Japanese Fulbrighters (with 13.1% checking "strongly agree"). More than 8 out of 10 of all Fulbrighters agreed that the homogeneity of the Japanese people is an important factor in the recovery of Japan (85.8% for Japanese and 81.2% for Americans). The American Fulbrighters were more likely to emphasize this by choosing "strongly agree" (41.7%) compared to 34.7% of Japanese Fulbrighters. The importance attributed to homogeneity of the Japanese by the American Fulbrighters was also apparent in their responses to a statement that asserts that Japanese society will lose its consensus on core values as foreign residents increase

in number. The majority of American Fulbrighters disagreed (63.9%, with 20.8% disagreeing strongly) with the statement, whereas the majority of Japanese Fulbrighters (53.8%, with 7% agreeing strongly) agreed. Both groups of Fulbrighters agreed that the current generation of young Japanese adults do not work as hard as their parents did (75.6% of Japanese and 79.7% of Americans). American Fulbrighters compared to Japanese Fulbrighters perceived a greater role in Japan for personal and social connections in attaining the best job, greater subordination of individual rights to public objectives, and greater homogeneity of the Japanese people.

Perceptions of Gender Roles

There were two statements about gender roles in Japan. Almost all the Fulbrighters strongly agreed that Japanese women should be given the same opportunities for self-development as Japanese men (95% of Japanese and 99.1% of Americans.) There was almost as much support for the observation that Japanese women will continue to emphasize the housewife and mother role as they move toward parity with men (88.9% for Japanese and 83% for Americans). American Fulbrighters were more likely to agree strongly with both statements (75.4% for American and 55.2% for Japanese Fulbrighters for the former, and 28.8% for American and 18.7% for Japanese Fulbrighters for the latter question). These responses reflect support by both groups of Fulbrighters, but particularly Americans, for gender equality as well as recognition of the strength of the traditional role of women in the family as Japan moves toward parity in gender roles.

Perceptions of Higher Education

There has been concern in Japan about its scientific contributions and the quality and rigor of its higher education system. This is unlike the almost universal admiration (perhaps begrudging respect is a more accurate characterization by some) for the products of its elementary and secondary educational system, even if there are concerns about the psychological pressures placed upon the students (U.S. Department of Education, 1987; Amano, 1992, pp. 1–8). Professor Susumu Tomenaga of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a Nobel Prize winner in medicine in 1987, said that he couldn't possibly have won the prize if he had stayed in Japan (*The Chronicle of Higher Education*, 1988, pp. A49–50). In the article, Bennett Brooks summarized the problems of research in Japan:

> Some of the problems with Japanese research are cultural. Society here values conformity over individuality, and Japanese educational institutions traditionally have stressed rote memorization. Although those characteristics have contributed heavily to the country's success in manufacturing and applied research, scientists say the same tendencies are sapping creative energy from Japan's quest for achievements in pure science.
>
> They say other failings are imbedded in the basic research system, which operates mainly through 96 national universities. Some professors, for example, criticize the system for channeling too much power and money to senior researchers regardless of the strength of their ideas. Others say the system favors decision making by groups rather than individuals, overemphasizes applied research, and closes too many doors to outsiders and outside ways (p. A-49).

What were the views of the Fulbrighters with regard to some of these issues? Large proportions of Japanese and American Fulbrighters strongly agreed or agreed (89.2% and 60.7%, respectively) that extensive reform of Japanese higher education is necessary to bring it up to world-class standards. The Japanese Fulbrighters felt quite strongly about this; 57.8% checked "strongly agree" compared to 25.5% of Americans. There was a difference in the responses by the Fulbrighters regarding the relationship of group conformity to the scientific creativity of the Japanese. A large proportion of Japanese Fulbrighters (70.9%) strongly agreed or agreed (of these, 20.7% checked "agree strongly") to the statement that scientific creativity will require the Japanese to become more individualistic and less group oriented. The American Fulbrighters were less sure about the necessity of this relationship. They were equally divided in their responses, 49.8% strongly agreed or agreed (of these, 10.1% strongly agreed) and 50.2% strongly disagreed or disagreed (of these, 11.1% strongly disagreed) with this statement. The Japanese Fulbrighters were more inclined to relate difficulties in scientific creativity to group pressures for conformity in Japan.

Perceptions of External Impacts on Japan

Three statements dealt with Japan and external relations. One statement concerned the source of pressures for social change in Japan. It has often been asserted by Japanese, foreigners, political leaders, scholars, and journalists, among others, that important sources for change in Japan are external events or pressures, such as the opening of Japan by Commodore Perry, the U.S. occupation after World War II, and the continuing negotiations by the U.S. government to gain more markets for American companies in Japan. An over-

whelming percentage of Japanese Fulbrighters, 92.9%, and almost two-thirds of American Fulbrighters, 62.5%, agreed that change in Japan comes largely in response to external pressures, such as from the United States, for example.

The second statement in this group concerned the Eurocentric orientation of the United States. The majority of Japanese Fulbrighters agreed (57.4%) whereas the majority of American Fulbrighters disagreed (55.1%) with the assertion that Japan should not expect to be as close as European countries are to the United States because of different history of relationships. Here, the Japanese Fulbrighters were more inclined to accept America's Eurocentric view, whereas American Fulbrighters disputed that. The third statement concerned the need for Japan to take a greater leadership role consistent with its development as an economic power. Most of the Japanese (96%) and American (90.3%) Fulbrighters agreed that Japan must take a greater role in world affairs commensurate with its economic strength.

Perceptions About the United States

Several of the statements referred to important aspects of Japan–United States relationships in the last half century. The effect of the legacy of World War II on American attitudes toward Japan was assessed. American Fulbrighters were more inclined (61.7%) to strongly agree or agree that anger and suspicion because of World War II are important factors in present day American attitudes toward Japan, whereas Japanese Fulbrighters were more inclined to disagree (57%). There is a slight gap in perception among the Fulbrighters, but more than a majority of both groups believed that the historical memory of World War II remains as a context for American perceptions and definitions of contemporary issues between Japan and the United States. These findings are similar to the findings of the *New York Times*, CBS, and Tokyo Broadcasting Company polls summarized earlier about Japanese and American views of each other on the 50th anniversary of Pearl Harbor.

A question about the Eurocentric orientation of Americans was phrased more generally to refer to Asia rather than specifically to Japan. Stated this way, there was much greater agreement by both Japanese and American Fulbrighters about the primary importance of Europe rather than Asia in salience to Americans. However, the proportion of Japanese who agreed (93.1%) was larger than the proportion of Americans who agreed (82.3%). It is interesting that the statement about the lower priority of Japan specifically—rather than Asia—had a much lower level of agreement by Japanese Fulbrighters and

was disagreed with by a majority of American Fulbrighters. This highlights the perception by the Fulbrighters of America's special relationship with Japan among Asian countries.

As Japan developed economic strength and the American deficits continued, there were increasing calls from various groups and individuals in the United States, particularly from legislators, that Japan should increase its spending for the self-defense forces. A statement about the need for the Japanese self-defense forces to share responsibility with the U.S. military in East Asia was designed to elicit the opinions of Fulbrighters about an enhanced role for the Japanese self-defense forces. The Japanese Fulbrighters (30.6%) were more reluctant than the American Fulbrighters (57.5%) to agree with the statement. Almost 7 out of 10 (69.3%) of the Japanese Fulbrighters disagreed with the statement. These views are similar to those of a random sample of Japanese and American adults in November 1991; 70% of Japanese and 20% of Americans agreed that "It is not appropriate to use military force [by Japan] even to maintain international justice and order," (*New York Times*, December 3, 1991).

Perceptions of the United States

Four of the opinion statements concerned social conditions or characteristics relating to individualism and cooperation in the United States. Large majorities of Japanese (77.7%) and American (66.4%) Fulbrighters agreed that in the United States, the public good is often subordinated to individual rights. American Fulbrighters were in greater agreement (85.8%) than Japanese Fulbrighters (67.8%) that American individualism needs to be tempered with more emphasis upon the welfare of groups and cooperation among individuals. A majority of both Japanese and American Fulbrighters strongly agreed or agreed (57.8% of Japanese and 61.9% of Americans) that the large number of ethnic groups in the United States makes it difficult to achieve consensus on long-term goals. Cooperation and group consensus are distinct social patterns in Japan, whereas individualism and freedom are its counterparts in the United States. No doubt exposure to patterns of cooperation and consensus in Japan are reflected in the responses of American Fulbrighters that in the United States, a higher priority is given to support for individual rights than to the public good and that individualism needs to be tempered with concern for group welfare and cooperation. The differing views of Japanese and American Fulbrighters on the role of ethnic pluralism in achieving consensus on long-term goals in the United States are probably rooted in the different experiences with population composition, as the Fulbrighters grew up in Japan (homogeneous) or the United States (diverse).

Two statements concerned work habits of young American adults and the state of elementary and secondary education in science and mathematics. These paralleled similar questions about the work habits of contemporary young Japanese adults and the present state of university education in Japan. Elementary and secondary education in the United States and university education in Japan have been viewed as problematic educational areas in the two countries. The rigorous study of science and mathematics in elementary and secondary education is seen as crucial for an educated work force capable of manufacturing high technology products. Japanese high school students are therefore trained in science and mathematics. Almost all of the American Fulbrighters (97.3%) strongly agreed or agreed (72% checked "strongly agree") and about 8 of 10 Japanese Fulbrighters (79.8%) agreed (27.8% checked "strongly agree") that American education needs to be more rigorous at the elementary and high school levels in science and mathematics. Majorities of Fulbrighters, Japanese (57.6%) and American (63%), agreed that the current generation of young American adults do not work as hard as their parents did. In comparison, the Fulbrighters were somewhat harsher about the decrease in work commitment of young Japanese adults; 75.7% of Japanese and 79.7% of Americans agreed that the current generation of young Japanese adults do not work as hard as their parents did.

Perceptions of the Trade Deficit

The persistent trade deficit of the United States with Japan starting in the 1980s has been a source of considerable sensitivity in both countries. A further aggravation has been the publicized Japanese investment in the United States, symbolized by the purchase of iconic American properties such as the Pebble Beach Golf Course in California and Rockefeller Center holdings in New York City. Two statements dealt specifically with these issues. Large numbers of Japanese and American Fulbrighters agreed (81% and 74%, respectively) that increasing investment in the United States by the Japanese is a matter of concern to Americans. Over 8 of 10 Japanese (82.1%) and two-thirds of the Americans (66%) agreed that American consumerism—as manifested in the large federal deficit and the low saving rate of Americans—rather than market barriers in Japan is a major factor in the trade imbalance. On the one hand, Fulbrighters of both countries were sensitive to American perceptions of Japanese investment as buying up symbolic American properties. On the other hand, the Fulbrighters also believed that there were basic economic factors deriving from the behavior of Americans that led to the imbalance in trade between the United States and Japan.

As Japan has prospered economically while the United States has stumbled

in the recent period, a number of solutions have been suggested. Large majorities of Fulbrighters, particularly Americans, agreed that American industry should invest more in research and development (96.6% of Americans and 62.7% of Japanese), and that American business needs to take the long view, as Japanese business does, rather than be driven by short-term profits (96.9% of Americans and 77.9% of Japanese). The American Fulbrighters were quite emphatic about such suggestions; 63.2% and 71.9% checked "agree strongly" about these two statements. Suggestions about lifetime employment and closer cooperation of government and industry as policies to assist in the greater economic prosperity of the United States were less attractive to the Fulbrighters. A scant majority of Japanese (50.3%) and Americans (53.1%) strongly agreed or agreed that lifetime employment for American workers, as in Japan, would increase productivity in the United States. Although a majority of the Japanese Fulbrighters disagreed (57%), 6 out of 10 American Fulbrighters (61.1%) believed that the close cooperation of government and industry in Japan is a model that the United States can emulate to regain its industrial edge.

The present economic difficulties in the United States, however, did not lead the Fulbrighters to take a pessimistic view of the future economic strength of the United States. The majority of Fulbrighters, Japanese (86%) and American (60.8%), believed that the United States will continue to be the leading economic power in the twenty-first century. Their optimistic views are not shared by the general Japanese and American public; 53% of Japanese and 52% of Americans believe that Japan will be "the number one economic power in the next century" (*New York Times*, December 3, 1991).

Assessment of Japan-U.S. Relations

We were interested in the net assessment by the Fulbrighters of the interaction of Japan and the United States since 1945; specifically about noneconomic factors involved in the present wave of Japan and America bashing and their views about the future course of Japan–U.S. relationships. Almost all of the Fulbrighters, Japanese (97.8%) and American (96.9%), agreed that the net impact of the U.S. influence on Japan since 1945 has been beneficial. More than half of the Japanese (54.3%) and a little less than half of the Americans (48.3%) checked "strongly agree." There was almost as much agreement by American Fulbrighters (90.5%) and a little less by Japanese Fulbrighters (75%) that the net impact of Japanese influence on the United States since 1945 has been beneficial. The lesser agreement about the influence of Japan on the United States by the Japanese Fulbrighters may

reflect a greater modesty. Nonetheless, it is striking that in spite of present difficulties in intersocietal relationships, both groups of Fulbrighters overwhelmingly agreed about the beneficial influence of the bilateral interactions in the last half century.

Their perceptions about the role of noneconomic factors in the present wave of America and Japan bashing were ascertained by parallel statements that such activity in Japan stems mainly from growing nationalism and arrogance rather than from economic factors and, in the United States, from prejudice and racism rather than from economic factors. There was greater agreement by Japanese Fulbrighters about racism and prejudice in the United States (59.8%) than about growing nationalism and arrogance in Japan (49.9%) in the manifestations of Japan and America bashing. The American Fulbrighters reversed positions—in line with the Fulbrighters of each country being more protective of their own country. Thus, American Fulbrighters agreed more with the role of noneconomic factors in Japan (58.1%) than in the United States (41.2%) in the bashing of the other country.

The future course of bilateral relationships was seen as somewhat more problematic by American Fulbrighters than Japanese Fulbrighters. More than 9 of 10 Americans (92.2%) and about three-quarters of Japanese (77.9%) agreed that competition and conflict in Japan–U.S. relations may become more intense. These were pessimistic projections by both groups of Fulbrighters. The general Japanese and American public were more optimistic than the Fulbrighters in a poll taken in November 1991 (*New York Times*, December 3, 1991). Only about a fifth of Japanese and American adults (22% and 19%, respectively) thought that in the next few years the overall relations between the United States and Japan will get worse.

A Profile of Japan and the United States

The third section of the opinion statements asked for assessments by the Fulbrighters regarding level of achievement or quality in Japan and the United States along a number of different dimensions. They were asked to check one of four ordered assessments: very high, high, low, and very low for each country. Two statements concerned level of scientific and technological achievement. Both groups of Fulbrighters rated the level of scientific and technological achievement in the two countries as high or very high by very large percentages (85.6% of Japanese and 92.9% of American Fulbrighters for scientific achievement in Japan, and 98.7% of Japanese and 98.7% of American Fulbrighters for scientific achievement in the United States). Larger

proportions of both groups of Fulbrighters chose "very high" for the level of scientific achievement of the United States (68% of Japanese and 72.9% of Americans) than they did regarding the level of scientific achievement of Japan, (18.4% of Japanese and 29.6%). Although the percentage choosing "very high" or "high" as the level of technological achievement in Japan and the United States was 91% or better, there was a reversal of positions by the Fulbrighters regarding the ratings at the "very high" level. Larger proportions of both groups of Fulbrighters chose "very high" as the level in Japan (63.1% of Japanese and 82.1% of Americans) than they did of the level in the United States (34.8% of Japanese and 44.5% of Americans). These assessments seem to be in line with those made by experts in both countries.

Two statements concerned the level of social science research and humanistic scholarship and the level of artistic achievement. Both groups of Fulbrighters overwhelmingly rated the level of social science research and humanistic scholarship in the United States as high or very high (91.5% of Japanese and 95.5% of Americans) compared to about half of those who chose the same level of assessment for social science and humanistic scholarship in Japan (49.5% and 54.2%). This difference in perception is in accord with the fact that social science research, in particular, has been more highly developed in the United States than in Japan. Large proportions of both groups of Fulbrighters rated Japan and the United States as high on the level of artistic achievement. The Americans were more lavish with their ratings: 92% of American Fulbrighters rated Japanese achievement in art as high or very high compared to 63.5% of the Japanese Fulbrighters; and 86.4% of American Fulbrighters rated American achievement in art as high or very high compared to 79.3% of Japanese Fulbrighters.

There is a clear difference in the perceptions of the quality of political leadership by the Japanese Fulbrighters. Almost 9 out of 10 (90.7%) of the Japanese Fulbrighters rated the quality of political leadership in Japan as low, with 35.8% choosing "very low." With respect to the quality of political leadership in the United States, almost as many of the Japanese Fulbrighters (86.6%) rated it as high, with 31% choosing "very high." The American Fulbrighters were more consistently negative about political leadership in both Japan and the United States, with 67.5% who rated political leadership in Japan as low or very low and 71.3% who rated political leadership in the United States as low or very low. Perhaps Japanese Fulbrighters remember American stewardship of Japan positively during the occupation period.

The Fulbrighters rated the quality of family life higher in the host country than in their home country. A larger proportion of Japanese Fulbrighters rated the

quality of family life in the United States as high or very high (71.6%) than did those who rated the quality of family life in Japan similarly (51.6%). A larger proportion of American Fulbrighters rated the quality of family life in Japan as high (73.4%) than did those who rated the quality of family life in the United States similarly. In fact, a majority of American Fulbrighters rated family life in the United States as low (51.4%). There was more agreement among the Fulbrighters about the quality of the environment. Japanese and American Fulbrighters agreed that the quality of the environment was low in Japan (71.4% Japanese and 62.7% American), and high in the United States (83.6% and 59.1%).

Finally, we come to three indicators of general overall achievements of the two countries, (a) level of economic achievement, (b) standard of living, and (c) quality of life. The level of economic achievement of Japan was rated as very high or high by almost all of the Fulbrighters (98.2% of Japanese and 99.4% of Americans). Somewhat smaller proportions similarly rated the level of economic achievement of the United States (75.4% of Japanese and 88.9% of Americans) as high or very high. The change in the level of economic achievement of Japan and the United States over the forty year period was reflected in the percentages of Fulbrighters who checked "very high." The percentage of Americans who chose "very high" to indicate the level of economic achievement in Japan was 81.9% compared to 35.3% to indicate the level of economic achievement in the United States. Similarly, 61.5% of Japanese chose "very high" to indicate the level of economic achievement in Japan compared to 13.9% about the level of economic achievement in the United States.

Almost all Fulbrighters agreed overwhelmingly that the standard of living is high in the United States (96.6% of Japanese and 97.2% of Americans) and somewhat smaller majorities rate it similarly in Japan (63.6% of Japanese and 88.3% of Americans). This more positive view of the standard of living in the United States as seen by both sets of Fulbrighters is emphasized by the percentages that chose the "very high" rating. About half of the Americans (50.3%) and 4 of 10 Japanese (42.1%) chose the "very high" rating regarding the standard of living in the United States compared to only 6.6% of Japanese and 24.7% of Americans who rated the standard of living in Japan as very high.

The ratings about the quality of life were also more favorable about the United States. More than 9 out of 10 of both groups of Fulbrighters (94.7% of Japanese and 91.5% of Americans) rated the quality of life in the United States as high; 35.8% of Japanese and 28.8% of Americans rated it as very high.

More than a majority (66.4%) of Japanese Fulbrighters rated the quality of life in Japan as low, (11.2% rated it as very low), whereas almost 4 of 5 Americans, 79.3%, rated it as high (17.3% rated it as very high). The Japanese Fulbrighters perceived a much greater gap in Japan between their economic achievement and standard of living on the one hand, and the quality of life on the other. Perhaps it is their experience with the quality of life in the United States that makes them more aware of the disparity in Japan.

Cohort Differences

We expected that some of the views about Japan and the United States would differ according to the period in which the Fulbrighter went to the United States or Japan. The changing conditions in both countries might lead the Fulbrighter to have different expectations and different experiences. The Fulbrighters were organized according to the decade in which they went abroad: the 1950s (1949 to 1959) to the 1980s.

There were significant differences ($p < .05$) in response, by decade in which the Fulbrighters went abroad, for 7 statements among the Japanese and 14 statements among the Americans. The cohorts among the Japanese Fulbrighters did not differ with respect to any of the contemporary assessments of levels and or quality of activity in Japan or the United States.

Three of the significantly different responses among the Japanese cohorts had regular increases or decreases from the 1950 cohort to the 1980 cohort. There were decreases in agreement by cohort that the office of the Emperor is essential in providing a national symbol for Japan (66.7% to 44.1%); that as foreign residents increased in number, Japanese society would lose its consensus on core values (56.8% to 30.3%); and that conflict, disorder, and unruliness in American life were necessary prices to pay for freedom and individuality (72.2% to 55.6%).

The Japanese Fulbright cohorts of the 1960s (93.2%) and 1970s (96.7%) agreed more than the cohorts of the 1950s (88.6%) and 1980s (64.7%) that the occupation reforms were important in changing family relationships toward greater equality. The cohort of the 1950s agreed the most (35.5%) that the self-defense forces would have to share responsibility with the U.S. military in East Asia, the cohort of the 1960s agreed the least (23.6%), and the cohorts of the 1970s and 1980s agreed more (27.6% and 29.4%). Large numbers of Japanese Fulbrighters in the cohorts of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s agreed (94.8%, 92.4%, 93.1%) that Americans still tend to be more concerned with events in Europe than in Asia; this decreased slightly in the cohort of

the 1980s (82.4%). The cohort of the 1960s agreed the most (82.5%) that competition and conflict in Japan–U.S. relations could become more intense, an increase from 78.2% agreement by the 1950s cohort. The more recent cohorts were more optimistic about the U.S.–Japan relationship: The percentage agreeing that conflict would increase dropped to 67.9% in the 1970s cohort and to 54.3% in the 1980s cohort. The unusual reaction of the 1960s cohort to the latter two statements may be the result of the turmoil associated with the ratification of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty of 1960 (Aruga, 1989, pp. 61–79). It appears that the youngest cohort is different from the others in being somewhat more confident and self-assured about the autonomous role of Japan. They agreed less with the important role of the occupation in initiating changes in individual and family rights, were less concerned with the role of the emperor in providing a national symbol for Japan, were more optimistic about the future of Japan–U.S. relations, were more likely to believe that Japan will have to take on a greater security role, and agreed less about the Eurocentric orientation of the United States.

Among the Americans, 8 of the 14 statements that were responded to differently in statistically significant patterns showed regular trends from the cohort of the 1950s to the cohort of the 1980s. Four of these statements were about Japan. There was a decrease in the percentages from the cohort of the 1950s to the cohort of the 1980s who agreed with the following statements: The reforms of the occupation were significant in changing family relationships toward greater equality (89.3% to 66.4%); the office of the emperor is essential in providing a symbol for Japan (78.6 to 53.5%); as foreign residents increase in number, Japanese society will lose its consensus on core values (49.1% to 27.1%); and Japan should not expect to be as close as European countries are to the United States because of different history of relationships (58.5% to 39.2%). One of the statements by cohorts with regular trends in responses was about the United States. The younger American cohorts agreed less than the older cohorts that the current generation of young adults do not work as hard as their parents (54.6% of the 1980s cohort and 73.6% of the 1950s cohort). The other three statements with regular trends in responses by cohorts were in the assessment of level or quality of activities in Japan and the United States. The large percentage of the 1950s cohort who checked "high" or "very high" as their evaluation of the level of social science and humanistic research in the United States (90.6%) increased to almost all of the 1980s cohort (99.2%). A similar trend was seen in the increase in assessment as high by the younger American cohorts about the level of artistic achievement in the United States; from 73.7% in the 1950s cohort to 93.1% in the 1980s cohort. The last regular trend by cohort was

a decreasing agreement about the quality of family life in Japan; from 92.5% who checked high in the 1950s' cohort to 64.3% in the 1980s' cohort.

There were three instances in which the responses of one American cohort departed significantly from the trend line. The cohort of the 1960s agreed more (90.2%) that the reforms of the occupation were significant in providing equal rights for women than did the cohorts of the 1950s (85.5%), the 1970s (80.4%) or the 1980s (68.5%). Similarly, the cohort of the 1960s agreed the least (59.7%) that Japanese women would continue to give priority to the roles of housewife and mother, even as they move toward occupational parity with men, compared to the cohorts of the 1950s (81.5%), 1970s (73.7%) and 1980s (62.3%). The cohort of the 1970s agreed the least (45.3%) that the United States should emulate the close cooperation of government and industry in Japan than did the cohort of the 1980s (57.4%), 1950s (73.1%), or the 1960s (70.7%).

The other differences in response patterns by cohort were more complex. The earlier American cohorts of the 1950s and 1960s were more likely to rate the quality of political leadership in Japan as high (48.2% and 41.8%) as compared to the cohorts of the 1970s and 1980s (24.5% and 25.6%). The majority of the cohorts of the 1960s and 1980s rated the quality of family life in the United States as high or very high (54.4% and 56.8%) compared to less than a majority of the cohorts of the 1950s and 1970s (41.5% and 32.1%). Smaller percentages of the youngest and oldest cohorts rated the quality of the environment in the United States as high or very high (45.3% and 59.8%) as compared to the middle cohorts (67.9% and 68.6%).

These differences in views by cohort among American Fulbrighters suggest some complex interplay of historic trends and period effects in their expectations and experiences.

Sex Differences

We expected that some of the views of women about Japan and the United States would differ from their male colleagues because of the difference in gender roles in Japan and the United States. American women would be expected to react negatively against the subordinate role of women in Japan, and Japanese women would be expected to react positively to the more equal relationships between the sexes in the United States. Additionally, women might be expected to be less militaristic and chauvinistic. Among the American Fulbrighters, only four opinion statements were responded to by men and women that showed statistically significant differences ($p < .05$). American

women Fulbrighters disagreed more than men that Japan should not expect to be as close to the United States as European countries; agreed more that increasing investment in the United States by the Japanese is a matter of concern to Americans; agreed more that America bashing in Japan stems mainly from growing nationalism and arrogance rather than from economic factors; and rated the standard of living in Japan as lower. These findings seem to assert a belief by American women Fulbrighters that Japan should have as equal a claim to the attention of the United States as Europe; a greater sensitivity to some of the highly publicized evidences of Japanese intrusion or conflict with the United States; and perhaps an emphatic sympathy with the greater difficulty faced by women in their daily lives in Japan.

A larger number of opinion statements (17) showed differences in response patterns by sex that were statistically significant ($p < .05$) among the Japanese Fulbrighters. In statements about Japan, women disagreed more (17.5%) than men (9.3%) that the occupation reforms were important in reforming absentee ownership of rural land, and women disagreed more (24.7%) than men (12.9%) that the homogeneity of the Japanese people was important in Japan's recovery from World War II.

In statements about the United States, Japanese women Fulbrighters disagreed more than men (81.2% to 68%) that the Japanese self-defense forces would have to share responsibility with the U.S. military in East Asia; that Americans still tend to be more concerned with events in Europe than events in Asia (12.8% to 6.1%); that conflict, disorder, and unruliness in American life are necessary prices to pay for freedom and individuality (44.4% to 30.6%); that the close cooperation of government and industry in Japan is a model for the United States to emulate (69% to 55.4%); that American business needs to take the long view as does Japanese business (32.5% to 20.9%); and that the United States would continue to be the leading economic power in the twenty-first century (21.4% to 13.2%). Japanese women agreed more than men (92.9% to 79.5%) that increasing investment in the United States by the Japanese is a matter of concern to Americans.

Japanese women Fulbrighters disagreed more than men (34.1% to 23.9%) that the net impact of Japanese influence on the United States since 1945 has been beneficial.

Japanese women Fulbrighters rated the levels of scientific achievement and art in Japan higher than did men (94.1% to 84.5%, and 74.7% to 62.2%, respectively). They were less likely than men to rate as high the level of economic achievement of the United States (64.6% to 76.7%), the quality of political leadership in the United States (78.8% to 87.6%), the quality of family

life in the United States (52.4% to 74%), and the quality of the environment in the United States (72.6% to 85) and in Japan (16.3% to 30.2%).

These results present a complex picture of the attitudes of female Japanese Fulbrighters as compared to their male colleagues. They were less impressed with the role of the occupation in land reform and of the homogeneity of the Japanese in the post-war recovery. They were more inclined to rate the level of various aspects of cultural activity and life in Japan as higher than in the United States. They were more assertive about having American attention paid to Japan as compared to the historic American preoccupation with Europe. They were more sensitive to the way in which Japanese business investment in the United States may be perceived by Americans and less likely to believe that Japanese influence on the United States since 1945 has been beneficial. They were less likely to believe that the United States should emulate the industry–government cooperation of Japan. They were more pessimistic that the United States will continue to be the leading economic power in the twenty-first century.

The Opinions of Colleagues

An important aspect of this study was to consider the impact of the sojourn experience on the opinions, perspectives, and assessments of the Fulbrighters about their own and the host societies. This was undertaken by comparing their views with their colleagues' who did not have a similar educational experience and period of residence in the United States or in Japan. As was pointed out earlier, the colleagues were very similar in socioeconomic characteristics to the Fulbrighters. We recognize that there are other factors that enter into the views of persons about their own and other countries. We assume, however, that a period of a year or two of residence in a foreign country in a career-related activity such as research or teaching will have a significant impact on views about the host country. Since this is the major difference that exists between Fulbrighters and their colleagues, we shall assume that any differences in their views about Japan and the United States may be attributable to the sojourn experience of the Fulbrighters.

What differences could one expect to come from the sojourn experience? Certainly, the experience of living in a foreign country is bound to provide a more complex view about that country. The activities of daily living and the encounter with persons in their own society is a profound experience, usually disabusing one from stereotypical views and validating other views. The net result of such experiences, however, is to increase the complexity of their views.

We assume that there will be more commonalities in the views of persons from the same country; that is, the native society or country, with its traditions and history, is the framework from which views about other societies and their inhabitants derive. We have already demonstrated some of the differences between Japanese and American Fulbrighters. In the assessments of Fulbrighters and their country colleagues, we expect the directional trends to be similar. The greater assurance that comes from living in another country might be expected to result in the Fulbrighters more often than their colleagues checking the "strongly agree" or "strongly disagree" categories than the milder "agree" or "disagree" (comparably "very high" or "very low" more often than "high" or "low") in their responses. We also expect that the differences would be smaller between the Japanese Fulbrighters and their colleagues than among the American Fulbrighters and their colleagues because Japan is a more homogeneous society than the United States.

To consider differences in the general pattern of responses between Fulbrighters and their colleagues, the responses were dichotomized as "agree" and "disagree," and "high" and "low." There were slightly more statements that were responded to differently by the Japanese Fulbrighters and Japanese colleagues (25, 43.1%) than by American Fulbrighters and American colleagues (21, 36.1%). In all cases except for one statement, the Japanese Fulbrighters agreed more or disagreed more (if disagree is 50% or more) than their colleagues. This was true in all cases except for four statements among American Fulbrighters and their colleagues.

Japanese colleagues disagreed more (80%) than Fulbrighters (69.3%) that the Japanese self-defense forces would have to share responsibility with the U.S. military in East Asia. American colleagues disagreed more (77%) than American Fulbrighters (57.4%) that the Japanese Self-Defense Forces will have to share responsibility with the U.S. Military in East Asia. American colleagues compared to American Fulbrighters disagreed more that the current generation of young American adults do not work as hard as their parents did (72.7% to 63%), and agreed more that the quality of family life in Japan was high (82.8% to 73.4%).

Both groups of Fulbrighters were more inclined to agree to an enlarged role for the Japanese self-defense forces than their colleagues, although large majorities of all four groups were not favorable to such a future role. American Fulbrighters perceived a greater dilution in work commitment in the United States and a lesser quality to family life in Japan than did their colleagues. These few exceptions confirm the real similarity in views of same-country Fulbrighters and their colleagues.

There was a difference in the response patterns of the Japanese and the Americans in the degree of agreement with the opinion statements or the rating of the two countries on various dimensions. The mean absolute differences in the percentage agreeing or choosing the high rating between Fulbrighters and colleagues in Japan and the United States is evidence of the differences in country response patterns. The mean absolute differences were twice as large for Americans (17.4%) than for Japanese (8.1%). American Fulbrighters differed more from their colleagues than Japanese Fulbrighters differed from their colleagues. This is further evidence of the greater homogeneity of the responses of Japanese as compared to the Americans.

Another dimension of the country differences in response patterns was the extent to which the Fulbrighters and colleagues chose the more extreme position, agreeing strongly or disagreeing strongly compared to choosing "agree" or "disagree," and similarly, choosing "very high" or "very low" compared to choosing "high" or "low" on statements assessing the level of activities in different arenas in the United States and Japan. Overall, there was much greater similarity in the intensity of response patterns than there was difference. The intensity differences that were statistically significant ($p < .05$) among the Japanese Fulbrighters and their colleagues occurred in 18 statements, or in 31% of the cases. Among the American Fulbrighters and their colleagues, this occurred in 19 cases, or 32.8% of the cases. Thus, in more than two-thirds of the cases, there were similar response patterns by intensity of endorsement among Fulbrighters and colleagues in both Japan and the United States.

Among the Japanese, in only one case was there a situation in which the colleagues more often chose "agree strongly" (15.6%) than did the Fulbrighters: (11.6%) to the statement that Japan bashing in the United States stems mainly from prejudice and racism, rather than from economic factors.

Among the Americans, there were four cases in which the colleagues chose the more intense position. Two of these were statements about the United States: 25.9% of colleagues compared to 17.4% of Fulbrighters strongly agreed that the Japanese self-defense forces would have to share responsibility with the U.S. military in East Asia; and 35.8% of colleagues and 19.3% of Fulbrighters strongly agreed that increasing investment by Japan in the United States is a matter of concern to Americans. Similarly, 38.8% of colleagues and 24.5% of Fulbrighters strongly agreed that competition and conflict in Japan–U.S. relations may become more intense. The fourth concerned the quality of family life in Japan that was assessed as very high by 20.1% of colleagues and 14.6% of Fulbrighters. The first three differences suggest

that the colleagues presented the prototypical American point of view more strongly than did the Fulbrighters. The Fulbrighters, on the basis of their experience in Japan, may have perceived Japanese family life in a more complicated way than their colleagues.

These results suggest that in about one-third of the opinion statements, the Fulbrighters differed from their colleagues in the degree of intensity with which they responded to the opinion statements. There was more diversity in the intensity response patterns among the Americans as compared to the Japanese; the American colleagues endorsed the "strongly agree" response more than the Fulbrighters in four cases and the Japanese colleagues endorsed the "strongly agree" response in one case.

Open-Ended Comments by Fulbrighters

We provided space for written comments about any views the respondent wished to express about the United States or Japan. From these, we selected some to indicate the range of their views. Some addressed the views that Americans have about Japan and the Japanese, as well as views that the Japanese have of Americans and the United States:

> The image of chaos (United States) or lockstep homogeneity (Japan) on the part of each nation is not a new consideration, but certainly one that continues to have a major influence on the perceptions each has of the other, not simply at lower societal levels, but at amazingly high levels of leadership. This is the greatest danger to future relationships and an issue that obviously goes to the heart of the social structure of each.
>
> The often-voiced fear in the Japanese political hierarchy of the positive dynamics of conflict (not physical) in creating social and political progress, and in the United States of the fear of repressiveness that might evolve through focused effort, are the most disheartening aspects (to me) of these two countries. This against the fact that both countries have an amazingly similar economic elite (though ones with what are currently quite opposite results, re: success) (#5328 American).

> There is still an "imbalance" of information: Japanese knowledge of the United States is more accurate than American knowledge of Japan. There are racist overtones in both perceptions: Japanese caricatures of American ethnic minorities (particularly of African-Americans) and myths of Japanese purity (*nihonron*); strong Japanese competition is still regarded with racial overtones in the United States.

It may well be that with "internationalization" (*kokusaika*) Japanese are progressing relatively faster toward a world view than are Americans.

As with relations between any two strong (economic) powers, there are "real" points of conflict (e.g. balance of payments), but they are often obscured by "unreal" points of friction. The single most important priority is to translate the remarkable two-way exchange—commercially, the largest cross-ocean trade in the history of the world—into firm international educational and cultural understanding (#5198 American).

Priority should be given to each country's domestic issues. The United States should not take retaliatory actions so easily. Since the arrival of Commodore Perry to Uraga in 1853, Japan has been supported by the United States in many ways. We respect and appreciate it deeply. Thus, Japan should try to help out sluggish U.S. economy. The United States could be an utopia once more. However, it is shameful that some American lawmakers mention retaliation each time they face some difficulties. It's not a problem between an ally and enemy (#0619, Japanese).

Both societies. . . have much to share with each other and with the developing countries of the world.

The United States can learn from Japan how to organize and manage technology development and commercialization of its products, while Japan can learn from United States how to live with and manage its new economic affluence and world-class power.

American industry and, to some extent, its universities are generally ignorant and rather arrogant about their Japanese counterparts. (But this seems to be changing, slowly. . .) It may take another 10–20 years before these two important institutions in U.S. society learn to appreciate the complementary values of the Japanese culture (#5098, American).

The Japanese should appeal to correct some Americans' misunderstanding or prejudice. Americans should realize most Japanese appreciate the U.S. support in the post-war period (#5083, Japanese).

Japan bashing may drive the Japanese more nationalistic. Japanese young people are becoming rather apathetic. Under the circumstances, if a charismatic nationalist appears, it could lead people in a wrong direction. Americans may want to try a softer approach to give more choices for Japanese than forcing their ideas. Demanding the opening of the rice market, or self-regulation of car exports may make young entrepreneurs take opposing stance to the United States (#0589, Japanese).

> For both governments' officials, it is true that they tend to show extreme attitudes either right or left, hawk or dove, in order to survive through elections. The current situation on this matter is the worst compared to the past. Both countries need to elect politicians who have real statesmanship (#524, Japanese).

Many commented on the importance of Japan being Japan and the United States being the United States. The Americans were more direct, the Japanese less so. One American Fulbrighter simply put it: "Long live the cultural differences between our two countries (#5065). In a similar vein, another American Fulbrighter stated:

> Realize the fundamental need for cultural diversity vis-a-vis Japan and the United States. My sense of the matter is that if global society did not have a Japan, one would have to invent such a community with Japan's special role and gifts (#5222).

An American woman said:

> I believe that the cultures of Japan and the United States were, are, and will be vastly different. I also believe that both countries, because of their differences, can benefit by acknowledging and appreciating these differences (#5215).

Another theme was the importance of ties between the United States and Japan in the last half century and the need to sustain these for mutual benefit. A number suggested that both countries make accommodations for the sake of the relationship:

> Japan and the United States have many mutual interests and much to be gained by increased interaction both economically and socially. The close working relations in the past 45 years have been highly beneficial to both countries and to the world as a whole. Every effort should be made to maintain and improve the relationships that have been developed.
>
> It is disturbing to me when we see dissension developing over trade and other economic policies. These could lead to conflicts and serious losses to both countries. Every effort should be made to improve our mutual understanding of each other and our common concerns. The Fulbright program has been a positive factor in this area (#5097, American).

> It is crucial, in my opinion, to preserve cordial relations with Japan. This will require modification of the bashing behavior on both sides of the Pacific, and good-faith competition in the economic realm. The United States will have to improve the quality of some of its exports and local products that are currently below Japanese standards. The Japanese will have to relax some trade barriers (like subsidies) fur-

ther than they have so far. There is no need whatever to resurrect some of the horrible animosities of the past (#5184, American).

In many ways, the United States and Japan are polar opposites from each other, which is why each is (and should be) of the highest interest to each other.

I feel strongly that despite all its problems the United States has done a magnificent job, throughout its history, in attaining/retaining freedom/prosperity/rights for all, especially in view of our heterogeneous population, and given human failings (i.e., the fact that no human is perfectly unprejudiced/wise/educated). I also feel strongly that Japan's attainments (especially in regard to the enormous amount of agreement among Japanese as to values and in 'law-abidingness,' etc.—all that makes Japan civilized and eminently liveable) would not have been possible if Japan had been as heterogeneous and open to immigration as the United States has always been. Americans have to pass along their values (e.g., love of liberty, democratic know-how) to millions of immigrants (many from lands where those are not cherished) as well as to their own children, year after year and generation after generation. Japanese have only their own to pass their values to (#5087, American).

I'm worried if the U.S.–Japan relationship is rapidly deteriorating. Japan should respond much more openly and flexibly. The United States may be shortsighted to misunderstand and envy Japan. I personally believe the amendments of the Constitution of Japan are necessary [for purposes of sending Japanese troops for peacekeeping purposes], but politically it's taboo, and the Japanese Constitution is made not to be adjusted. Therefore, we should let Americans know Japanese don't have any choice but to keep the constitution's principles (#494, Japanese).

We need another 100–200 years to understand each other as both the United States and Japan have built upon different backgrounds. Americans have excellent human resources, plenty of land and natural resources that were undestroyed through World Wars. Japanese have only brains and solid social system to support them to compete with Americans. Fulbrighters should be utilized to fill the gaps (#0559, Japanese).

Both Japanese and American governments tend to push their ideas as superpowers. Thus, the American fairness and Japanese harmony are not fostered unless they open up each other and act on specific measures (#570, Japanese).

Finally, comments from a Japanese and American Fulbrighter relate their sojourn experiences to their present views:

My main goal of the Fulbright experience was to expose myself to the American culture in every field rather than stick to the specific academic field. I could get to know not only Americans, but also people from all over the world. I value my experience because one country boy grew to be a true cosmopolitan. When I visited the United States, Americans were so kind to me, who was from the loser country of World War II. Japan bashing didn't exist in 1953 when I visited the United States. As the situation has changed drastically now, and economic power is almost comparable, Americans may consider Japanese a competitor rather than a child. Emotional conflict doesn't merit either side. I appreciate after World War II, Japan was occupied by the United States instead of divided into four countries' management (United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and France). Current Japanese prosperity would not be achieved without American support, which for example, broke down the old feudal land system (#0788, Japanese).

In my opinion, even after these many years of close relationships, Americans and Japanese still tend to see one another as very different. These differences seem to receive the most attention in the mass media and in the limited amount of education devoted to each other. As a result, large numbers of people, especially in the United States, come to believe that Japan and America are basically incompatible and bound to have frictions and conflicts. The Fulbright experience and others like it usually demonstrate the many similarities that exist between Americans (and other peoples) and Japanese, that much is shared in common despite some differences. What is needed is much more emphasis, in the news and education, particularly in the United States, of the similarities and compatibilities rather than differences and hostilities. This is not to deny the diversity, but to place it in perspective and come to accept it as a rational expectation, not as a cause for hysteria. Japan and the United States will be the two superpowers of the twenty-first century—cooperation between them can stand in stark contrast with the cold war of the twentieth century (#5039, American).

Conclusion

The interchange of Japanese and American graduate students, researchers, and lecturers that was initiated in 1952 under the Fulbright program has been a significant educational experience for the participants. Several reports of the accomplishments of both Japanese (including the Kobayashi study as reported in the abstract) and American alumni of the Fulbright program document the significant contribution they have made professionally in their subsequent careers. Illustrious and distinguished alumni abound in both countries.

This study found that most American Fulbrighters were from the academic

world, whereas Japanese Fulbrighters were employed in private industry and government as well. Both groups of Fulbrighters graduated or received their advanced degrees from the top-ranked academic institutions in their home countries and were associated with the top-ranked institutions in the host country for their educational projects.

The Fulbrighters in this study were predominantly men, with 11.2% of the Japanese and 16.9% of the Americans being women. Professional objectives were the most important motivations for the Fulbrighters, although many had idealistic goals as well. Professor Kobayashi found that Japanese women were inwardly oriented and gained more in "self-confidence," whereas Japanese men were outwardly oriented to "broaden" their outlook. We found that proportionally more American women were interested in professional development objectives than American men.

The context of bilateral relations was an important factor in the impact of the Fulbright experience. In 1952, Japan had recently regained its sovereignty and was still recovering from the physical and social devastation of World War II. By the 1990s, Japan had become a highly productive and prosperous society competitive with the United States. Thus, Japanese Fulbrighters who went in the earlier periods to the United States and American Fulbrighters who went in the later periods to Japan were more affected than the other cohorts. Professor Kobayashi's study also found the period of sojourn to be significant in the experiences of Japanese Fulbrighters. That entry into the host country and return home was a noticeable transition is indicated by reports from the Fulbrighters that a period of time was necessary to adapt to the daily routines of life in the host country as well as upon their return home. American women reported taking a longer period of time than the American men to feel comfortable and relaxed in Japan as well as on their return home.

The distinct configuration of social patterns of the host country was observed by the Fulbrighters, particularly, the informality, candor, and individualism of American society and the separation of gender roles and the imbeddedness of individuals in groups in Japanese society. The Japanese were more positive in general about American social patterns than the Americans were about Japanese social patterns. Still, a number of Americans were positively inclined toward Japanese patterns of formality and hierarchy in interpersonal relationships.

The Fulbrighters were personally affected by their overseas experiences. Most reported that their sense of national identity was impacted by their immersion in the host country. American women were more likely than American men to find their sense of national identity disrupted. Almost all the Japanese

and American Fulbrighters incorporated aspects of the other society's cultural values or behavior patterns into their present life-styles. The Japanese Fulbrighters, in general, incorporated a larger proportion of American values than the Americans incorporated Japanese values and behavior norms. These result from the attraction of individualistic and democratic values, the steady movement in this direction by Japanese society in the last 50 years, and the younger average age of the Japanese Fulbrighters, 28.7 years, compared to 38.4 for the American Fulbrighter.

The views of the Fulbrighters about bilateral issues are complex. In the main, both American and Japanese Fulbrighters agreed on the importance of the reforms initiated by the U.S. occupation in facilitating the emergence of the present economically prosperous Japan. They also agreed that the consensus-oriented, hard-working characteristics of the Japanese were important in that development. Women Fulbrighters were more sensitized to gender and environmental issues than the men.

The views of the Fulbrighters differed somewhat from their Japanese and American colleagues who had not studied in the United States or Japan. More Fulbrighters than their colleagues agreed to an enlarged future role for the Japanese self-defense forces. A larger proportion of American Fulbrighters than their colleagues perceived a greater dilution in work commitment in the United States and a lesser quality of family life in Japan.

Almost all of the Fulbrighters agreed that the net impact of the United States and Japan on each other in the last half century has been beneficial. But the present difficulties over the trade imbalance have darkened their vision of future bilateral relationships. Larger proportions of the Fulbrighters than the American or Japanese public in general felt that the bilateral relationships may become more competitive and conflicting. Their concerns reflect a sense that the mutually beneficial relationships between the two countries need to continue. Many commented about the necessity of speaking out to clarify, correct and detail the simple images used by politicians and the national media in both countries.

We can conclude that the Fulbright experiences have had major and continuing positive influences on the lives of most all participants since the initiation of the Japan–United States Fulbright Program in 1952. Most Fulbrighters have spoken or written about their sojourn experiences to varied audiences in their home countries and continue to be sensitive to international concerns where Japan and the United States are involved. Through such activities, the Fulbrighters have enlarged the positive influence of the Fulbright experience to a wider audience beyond those immediately involved.

Appendices

Appendix I. Summary of Professor Kobayashi's Study on the Effects of Study Abroad: Cases of the Fulbright Graduate Students

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Emeritus Professor, Kyoto University
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OUTLINE OF THE RESEARCH

This research aims at examining the significance of graduate study of Japanese students in American universities that had taken place from the end of World War II to the 1980s. Among various resources with which Japanese students studied in the United States during the period, the Fulbright (and GARIOA) grant was outstanding in caliber, both quantitatively and qualitatively. The grantees number more than 3,000. It is also common knowledge that the grants made a great contribution to the development of post-World War II Japan as well as to the strengthening of Japan–U.S. mutual understanding and friendship, by providing young, promising scholars with opportunities for their personal development academically, culturally, and socially.

Originally proposed by the IIE as a joint Japanese–German cooperative project, the opportunity for the research was kindly given by Ms. Caroline A. Yang, executive director of the Japan–United States Educational Commission, Tokyo, who supplied a list of 3,013 graduate student Fulbright grantees

(as of 1987) to a group of eight researchers in the fields of comparative education, psychology, and sociology. The research was conducted for three years from 1988 to 1990, and was supported generously by the Matsushita International Foundation, to which the first report was submitted in September 1990. With a few modifications and improvements, the final report was made in September 1991 and published in the following spring by the Research Center for University Education of Hiroshima University as one of its research series. The Japan–U.S. Educational Commission also provided a grant for writing this English language report.

The research was based on a questionnaire survey. For this purpose, a 19-page questionnaire was constructed after a preliminary study, in order to induce observations on the following questions:

(1) In the different periods of the post-World War II development of Japan, what did the Japanese graduate students expect from their graduate studies in American universities? What did they learn? How had they profited on their return home? And what had their studies given to society?

(2) How did their graduate study affect their personal growth and their social and professional lives?

(3) What are the individual attributes and social and cultural conditions which might make the study abroad most effective, both socially and individually?

It certainly would be a presumption to claim that this research has found satisfactory answers to these questions, but it could safely be said that some clues to them might have been given by findings of the research, which will be summarized in the following report.

THE PROFILE OF THE GRANTEES

The 1,329 respondents to our survey were distributed by the years of departure for studying in American universities as follows: 1.4% up until 1949, 34.5% in the period 1950–1954, 21.2% during 1955–1959, 18.8% during 1960–1964, 13.6% during 1965–1969, 5.4% during 1970–1979, 5.2% during 1980–1987. Graduate student grantees from Japan reached the highest number in the period 1950–1954, and thereafter gradually declined in number till the end of the 1960s, when they radically fell to the level of one-thirteenth of the peak period of 1950–1959. This trend corresponds with the one found in the total population of the Fulbright graduate student grantees, and certainly reflects the changing academic, economic and social environments in which Japanese students lived as well as the changing policy and funding of the Fulbright program by both U.S. and Japanese governments over those periods.



The respondents are divided into 86.7% men and 13.3% women, but the latter occupy 16% of the total graduate and student grantees, indicating proportionally less women responding to our survey.

The average age of the respondents at the time of their departure for study was 28–29 years old, and at present 84.4% of them are over 50 years of age, as nearly half of them received the grants some 30 years ago.

Among the respondents, 25.4% of them received the GARIOA grants, 27.9% the Fulbright all-expense grants, and 49.7% the Fulbright travel grants. Among them, 42.5% supplemented the grants either privately or by receiving grants from other sources, such as American universities, philanthropic organizations, or their home institutions. Also, 43.9% of them earned money through professional or nonprofessional jobs during their stay.

The distribution of the respondents by their disciplines leans heavily toward social science (51.4%) and humanities (18.8%) throughout the whole period. Especially since the 1970s, these fields of study together had occupied 96.2% of all grantees. Those in fields of natural science and engineering were concentrated in the 1950s and 1960s.

The length of stay in the United States varied; the majority (50%) stayed for less than two years, 24.6% for two to three years, 9.4% for three to four years, 7.3% for four to five years, and 8.7% for five years or longer.

The respondents studied in 192 U.S. universities, largely in the Northeast and the Midwest. The universities where the largest numbers of them studied are Michigan, Illinois, Columbia, UCLA, and Harvard in rank order. The first three universities received the largest share of respondents until the mid-1960s, while the latter two attracted a high proportion of them in the later periods. Those who studied at more than two universities totalled 22.1%.

Those who registered as full-time graduate students are 55% in total. The later the generation, the more students who studied full time, totalling 75 to 100% after the latter half of the 1960s. Among the grantees, 29.7% received master's degrees, and 13.1% earned doctorates. The main fields of specialization for these degrees, in rank order, are: social science, humanities, engineering, and physics, for the master's degrees; and social science, engineering, physics and humanities for the doctorates. The percentage of degree recipients among the women students is higher than among the men; the women's degrees are mostly in the fields of social science and humanities.

As to the Japanese universities from which the respondents received their bachelor's degrees, a large concentration (69.1%) came from national universities. Notably, the graduates of the University of Tokyo total 29.5%. Alongside the other established research universities, both national (Kyoto) and private (Waseda and Keio), which sent more than 50 students each, the smaller women's universities (Tsuda and Tokyo Women's) and a newer university of international character (International Christian) also sent relatively large numbers of students.

Before studying in the United States, 77.5% of the respondents held jobs either in universities and research institutes (20.4%), government offices, public corporations and schools (20.1%), or private enterprises (23.7%). The rest of them (20.4%) had been students. After 1964, the proportion of students increased. After returning home 99% took jobs, and the present places of work (or former workplaces of those who have retired) are concentrated in universities/research institutes (46.9%) and private enterprises (30.1%). Before studying abroad, 75.5% of university teachers and researchers were below the rank of instructors, and 90.1% of those working in government and private enterprises were in nonexecutive positions, while at present, 78.3% of those working in universities and research institutes are professors, 9.3% are presidents, and 32% of those in private enterprises are top executives.

EXPERIENCES DURING THE STUDY

The respondents regard the following experiences during the study as most impressive and important: being exposed to the vastness of America (42.1%), learning new theories and knowledge (39.7%), and personal experiences in a multiethnic society (39.5%). Women respondents gave emphasis more than men upon the following points: earning wanted degrees or qualifications and becoming self-confident in prospective professional careers. Among those less confident in English, mention is often made of being frustrated by the cultural gap with the Americans. Those who studied in the earlier period often refer to points such as being exposed to the vastness of America, the realization of American affluence, and an acquisition of English to express oneself, while those younger generations refer to learning new theories and knowledge and earning of wanted degrees and qualifications.

About half of the respondents noted the following values of their overseas study: establishing the ground for prospective research or professional careers (50.1%), broadening one's horizon (48.2%), and understanding Japanese culture from different angles (47.7%). Men tended to be interested in outward observations, referring to understanding the generosity of Americans and broadening one's horizon, while the women's interest was inward, referring to becoming self-confident and setting up a ground for new professional careers. The earlier generations tended to refer to their understanding and changing attitudes toward the Americans, while the later generations more often found the values of the study in their prospective careers. Those who adapted well to American life tended to find good points in both America and Japan, while those who were less adaptable referred to the understanding of Japanese culture from different angles and becoming conscious of being Japanese.

The level of adaptation to American life during the study can be measured in different dimensions. Three different levels of understanding have been identified; 50.6% got some knowledge of the American social system, 30.6% understood the system, and 18.5% accepted its values. As to American customs, 46.6% knew them, 44.7% understood them, and 11.2% accepted them. On the behavioral level, the behavioral patterns of the Americans were rejected by 9.7%, while being partly accepted by 79.2%, and largely accepted by 11.2%. On the emotional level, some 47.1% did not identify themselves with American culture, while 47.9% found some sympathy with it, and 5.1% found themselves close to identifying with it. These findings indicate that a considerable number of them understood, and even accepted, the American social system. American customs and behavioral patterns were understood and

at least partly accepted by a large number, while rejected by a few and largely accepted by a few more. With regard to identifying with American culture, more than half of them have sympathy with it at different levels, while the other half felt alienated from it.

By combining the above-mentioned indices, the respondents can be divided into three groups, each of a different level of adaptation to or acceptance of American life; high adaptation group (9.6%), middle group (66.1%), and low group (24.3%). Those who studied in their 30s and 40s tend to be found among the low group , while those who studied in their 20s are found among the high group. Among the latter group, there were also those who married during the study period, and they tended to accept American behavior and values. Those who stayed for a longer period are often found in the high group and seem to accept American behavioral patterns. Those who stayed for one to two years are spread through all three groups. Those who earned doctorates are found among the high group who accepted the social system. Many of those who did not earn degrees are in the low group and acquired only knowledge of the American social system.

THE GRANTEES ON THEIR RETURN HOME

Before receiving grants, 79.4% of the men and 58% of the women had jobs, and on their return till the present time, almost everyone had or has a job. On their immediate return, 72% of men returned to their previous places of work, but only 36.4% of the women did. Among those who had no job before, 46.2% of men and 39% of women found jobs within one month, and the majority of them (82.7% men and 92.1% of women) consider their studies abroad as the major factor for finding jobs. Of all grantees, 53.7% of men and 48% of women have changed jobs more than once, and around 70% of both sexes consider such changes favorably. The reason for the changes include: the study abroad opened new job opportunities, it changed one's own outlook on life, and the new job seemed to offer more chances to utilize knowledge and skills acquired during the study. The respondents found their study abroad not so effective in promotion (58.7%) and pecuniary reward (43.6%). This may reflect the career pattern of Japanese society based on seniority, but it is interesting to note that a fairly large number of them (70.4%) nonetheless found study abroad advantageous to their careers. On these matters, there is no difference by generation, nor by sex, although women are found slightly more than men among the group answering very advantageous.

The majority of them found the acquired knowledge and skills being utilized effectively in the following items: use of English in work (85.2%), achievement in specialties (78.6%), further acquisition of knowledge and skills on

the job (78.2%), and utilization of the knowledge of America (72.9%). Fewer respondents found it useful in the assessment by superiors (62.5%) and by colleagues (66%). The differentiation by sex is not distinctive, except for a few items: more women than men find the study abroad effective in the assessment by superiors and colleagues and in utilization of English, while men found more value in achievements in specialties. The later generations tend to rate it high in achievement in specialties, while the earlier generations, notably the GARIOA grantees, do so in the assessment by superiors and colleagues and utilization of English. Those who stay longer tend to feel it less effective in the assessment by superiors and colleagues and utilization of knowledge of America, while more effective in achievement in specialties and use of English. The differences by disciplines are small, although those in humanities tend to rate the study abroad higher than others.

Since returning home, nearly half of the respondents (46.9%) have received some kind of social recognition, such as degrees, prizes, decorations and book reviews related to their study abroad. Understandably, the earlier and elder generations have received more than others.

Many of them (79.8)% have had opportunities for giving public lectures on their experiences, both academic and non-academic, during their study abroad. Many of them (77.9%) have written on matters relating to their experiences abroad. Those engaged in teaching and research have had more opportunities for such lectures and publications than others, among whom, however, those working in private enterprises have had a relatively high rate of opportunities.

The grantees have also been involved in some kind of international activities since their return; participation in international conferences (83.5%), organization of such conferences (39.7%), receiving of old friends (67.7%), hosting of foreign students (22.2%), and volunteering for international activities of different kinds (22.2%).

EFFECTS OF STUDY ABROAD

The respondents were asked to rank their top three study-abroad objectives. The following objectives were chosen most frequently as their primary objective: to acquire specialized knowledge or skills (52.9%), to enrich experiences and broaden their horizon (9%), to satisfy their interest in America (8.9%), to earn higher degrees (7.9%), to improve their English (4.7%), and to expand their professional outlook (4.5%). The most frequent secondary objectives were: to improve their English (20.3%), to enrich experiences and broaden their horizon (19.7%), to earn higher degrees (13.6%), to acquire

specialized knowledge or skills (12.6%), and to satisfy their interest in America (10.4%). The third goals were most frequently: to enrich experiences and to broaden their horizon (29.6%), to improve their English (19.7%), to acquire international outlook (14%), and to satisfy their interest in America (10.6%).

In all, improvement of English language and enrichment of experiences were weighted relatively highly by the earlier generations of grantees until around 1960, while the acquisition of professional knowledge and earning degrees were thought important by those later generations.

These primary objectives are considered by the majority of respondents (87.5%) to have been achieved fully or satisfactorily. An equally large number of them (81.7%) hold that they were able to utilize these achieved objectives fully or satisfactorily after returning home. Among these objectives, acquisition of professional knowledge, enrichment of experiences, and broadening international outlook are considered to be achieved and utilized fully or satisfactorily by all generations. There is a generational difference in acquisition of English; 80-90% of those grantees in the 1950s achieved this objective, but only 65% did in the 1980s. The objective of earning higher degrees was achieved by 100% of respondents in the earlier generations, but the percentage gradually declined to 80.4% in the 1980s. The utilization of the earned degrees remained at the level of 70% in the earlier generations, and then began to decline in the 1970s, falling to 55% in the 1980s. In this particular objective, women respondents showed higher achievement and utilization than men.

The responses on the achievement of the secondary and third objectives and their utilization show similar tendencies, although they are in the lesser category in comparison with the primary objectives.

As regards improvement of English, regarded as the prime objective of study by 4.7% of the respondents, as the secondary one by 20.3%, and as the third one by 19.7%, the respondents in general acknowledged satisfactory achievement, becoming confident in conversation and discussion and more so in writing and reading by the end of their study period. Many have maintained such language standards until the present, although some recognized a decline in conversation skills, while others have become more confident in discussion in their own professional fields. The length of U.S. study correlates with the degree of improvement in English abilities, but has little relation with its maintenance after returning home. The latter is more related to the frequency of international activities both abroad and at home.

CONCLUSION

While 1,329 respondents to our survey share a common experience of having spent their youth in the United States of America for graduate studies through the Fulbright (and GARIOA) grants, they differ much among themselves in their backgrounds and the environments in which they studied. As to the latter, one of the most important determining factors is the time period, which spans 40 years, and at what particular time each individual studied. The Fulbright (GARIOA) program started in the preindependent era of Japan, when Japanese youth suffered from higher education damaged by the war and lack of information about the outside world, not to mention economic and social difficulties. The enthusiasm of the early grantees for study abroad is beyond the imagination of those living in the present day, when the opportunity for higher education is abundant and communication with and travel to the outside world are so easy. The succeeding generations of grantees also share such enthusiasm, though in their own way. For one thing, the United States did not appear to the Japanese youngsters as an exotic dreamland anymore, as the economic, social and cultural gaps between the two nations were becoming less distinctive. It is true that the university campus and the surrounding society still retained many charms which stirred their enthusiasm and from which they would greatly profit. Reflecting such changes in the time, the later generations of grantees tended to direct their enthusiasm toward narrower professional fields more than did earlier ones, which diverted it into the wider aspects of American life.

The enthusiasm of grantees was well rewarded by their rich experiences during the study abroad in both professional and non-professional fields. These experiences, which they acquired through contacts with people and nature, not only gave them the opportunity for personal growth, but also equipped them with knowledge and skills that helped them to enrich their experiences after returning home. It is interesting to note that women more than men gained more confidence in themselves through study abroad, resulting in more rewarding lives after returning home. Both these women and men grantees, however, made equally great contributions after returning home to the development of Japan in their capacities as professionals and citizens. Many also participated positively in international activities, which no doubt served to promote understanding and cooperation among peoples, above all between Japan and the United States.

The success of the Fulbright program has been due to various reasons, among which our study identifies some of the most significant: The Fulbright program rightly met the needs of the time; in the 1950s, it provided the chance

for a large number of Japanese students, whose opportunities for graduate studies were limited at home and abroad, to study in American universities. They were chosen from among the wide realm of specialist areas, each of which desperately needed young men and women equipped with new professional knowledge and skills, in order to make up for time lost during the war. The new relationship with the United States necessitated that Japan be served by young people who could understand and interpret American society and culture. In the 1960s and after, such needs continued to exist, but in different forms. The Fulbright program became more selective in meeting the needs of the time, as other resources became more available to Japanese students for study abroad. Thus, in selecting scholars, special attention was given to certain areas of specialization or to certain groups of students. So long as this selection was done in a timely and proper way, there was no lack of candidates who would profit from the program, as the cases of many women grantees vividly witnessed.

Another reason for the success lies in the effective system of the program itself and in the equally effective supporting systems in the American society. Much credit should be given to the works of the Fulbright Commission, the Institute of International Education, American universities, and other numerous organizations and individuals, all of which in their own roles have made this program an international model for student exchange.

Finally, the present author must admit that these concluding remarks may sound a little impressionistic and subjective, but he himself, as one of the Fulbright graduate student grantees, could not help indulging himself by putting his own personal views in this report.

Appendix II. Regression Analyses of Identity and Life-Style Values

From Professor Uyeki's Study of Japanese and U.S. Fulbrighters
(see page 43)

The following is the regression analysis undertaken to explore the relationships related to the extent to which the individual Fulbrighters reported that their national identity was disrupted and the host-country values incorporated into their life-styles during the study abroad experience.

The scores on the six different types of social patterns reported on earlier were averaged. These ranged from one to four (a lot = 1, some = 2, little = 3, not at all = 4). The evaluations of these social patterns, that ranged from positive to negative in five ordered categories, were also averaged. The

ly, evaluations of the Fulbright experience on professional, family, and personal lives were averaged.

The nine independent variables were regressed on the two dependent variables: the scores of the Fulbrighters on (a) the extent of reported influence on their view of identity (IDENTITY), ranging from one to four, and (b) their position on the life-style continuum (LIFESTYL), ranging from one to nine.

The regression equations, using standardized beta weights were as follows:

For Japanese Fulbrighters:

IDENTITY = A − .056(ESCOPATJ) + .018(MAJORJ) − .121(F8BSTYR)
− .013(A7GEFULB) + .123(SCOPEINF) − .027(S2EX)
− .037(F8MONAB) + .047(TSOCPATJ) + .113(EXPGOOD) + e.

LIFESTYL = A + .011(ESCOCPATJ) + .030(MAJORJ) + .066(F8BSTYR)
− .039(A7GEFULB) + .071(SCOPEINF) + .001(S2EX)
+ .076(F8EMONAB) + .013(TSCOPATJ) + .250(EXPGOOD) + e.

For American Fulbrighters:

IDENTITY = A − .002(ESOCPATA) + .052(EXPGOOD) − .111(A7GEFULB)
+ .030(MAJORA) + .155(TSCOPATA) + .141(S2EX)
+ .054(F8BSTYR) + .380(SCOPEINF) − .030(F8EMONAB) + e.

LIFESTYL = A + .126(ESCOPATA) + .130(EXPGOOD) + .032(A7GEFULB)
− .052(MAJORA) − .115(TSOCPATA) − .009(S2EX)
+ .023(F8BSTYR) + .356(SCOPEINF) +. 152(F8MONAB) + e.

The results suggest that individual differences were more important for American Fulbrighters than for Japanese. For Japanese Fulbrighters, the coefficients of multiple regression are smaller even if statistically significant. In the case of the impact on identity of Japanese Fulbrighters, the multiple R is .245, and the adjusted variance explained is 4.3%. The significant variables related to greater influence on identity of Japanese Fulbrighters are (1) FB8STYR—earlier tenure as Fulbrighter ($p < .00$), (2) SCOPEINF—greater influence of the American sojourn on their personal and family lives ($p < .00$), and (3) EXPGOOD—more positive evaluation of the impact of the Fulbright experience on their personal and social lives ($p < .01$). For American Fulbrighters, the impact of these variables on their identity is much higher, with a multiple R of .486, and adjusted variance explained of 20.3%. The significant variables related to greater influence on identity are (1) SCOPEINF—great

er influence of the Japanese sojourn on their personal and social lives ($p < .00$), TSOCPATA—greater observation of Japanese social patterns ($p < .01$), and (3) SEX—sex of the Fulbrighter ($p < .02$).

The regression on life-style values suggest that for the Japanese, the only significant factor is EXPGOOD—the overall evaluation as positive or negative of the sojourn experience on their professional, family, and personal lives ($p < .00$). The multiple R is .324 and the adjusted variance explained is 8.9%. For the American Fulbrighters, the multiple R is .522 and the adjusted variance explained is 24%. The significant variables related to differences in life-style values are (1) ESOCPATA—evaluation of Japanese social patterns ($p < .04$), (2) XPGOOD—net evaluation of their sojourn experience ($p < .04$), (3) SCOPEINF—influence of sojourn experience on their personal lives ($p < .00$), and (4) F8MONAB—number of months abroad in Japan ($p < .02$). Sex differences are not related to differential life-style values of the American Fulbrighters, although women reported more impact on their American identity than did men. In other words, although American women Fulbrighters report more impact on their identity as Americans than men, there was no sex differential regarding their present mix of American and Japanese life-style values.

Clearly, their experiences and evaluations of these experiences had a greater impact on the American Fulbrighters' identity and lifestyle values than was the case for the Japanese Fulbrighters. It was possible, in other words, to find a set of variables that predicted individual differences in identity impact and mix of life-style values better for American than for Japanese Fulbrighters. Yet Japanese Fulbrighters reported being affected more on these two dimensions than American Fulbrighters. It seems fair to conclude that the situational factors were more important in the case of Japanese Fulbrighters than were individual factors.

It is interesting that the age of the person at the time of the sojourn experience was not statistically significant for the Japanese or American Fulbrighters. However, decade of tenure as Fulbrighter was significant for the Japanese. This suggests that the changing set of relationships between the two countries was a factor in the impact of the experience on Japanese Fulbrighters. Earlier cross tabulations had suggested a differential cohort effect, with the Japanese in the earlier period reporting their views of identity more influenced than those who went to the United States in the later decades. For the Americans, the influence on identity was reversed, with greater impact on views of identity reported by those going to Japan in the most recent decade. These analyses and the data presented earlier suggest that the sojourn experience

and its consequences are more similar among the Japanese Fulbrighters than it is for the Americans. Yet, individual differences in experiences and reactions are related to influence on identity and present life-style values among the Japanese Fulbrighters, even if the relationships are not as large as they are among the Americans.

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